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Nederlandstalige samenvatting  
Duurzame ontwikkeling heeft de laatste drie decennia veel aandacht gekregen. De eerste en meest 
gebruikte definitie, geïntroduceerd in het Brundtland Report (1987), omschrijft duurzame 
ontwikkeling als `ontwikkeling die voldoet aan de noden van vandaag, zonder de toekomstige 
generaties te beperken in het voldoen van hun noden in de toekomst.’ In de nasleep van de financiële 
crisis in 2008, is duurzame ontwikkeling een bedrijfsbenadering geworden voor lange-termijn 
overleving en duurzaamheid van ondernemingen in ontwikkelde economieën en intussen heeft het 
zich ook verspreid over ontwikkelingslanden. Het streven naar duurzame ontwikkeling vereist van 
ondernemingen dat ze hun uitstekende duurzaamheidsprestaties inzake economische ontwikkeling, 
bescherming van het milieu en sociale verantwoordelijkheid aantonen.  
De doctoraatsthesis focust vooral op de duurzaamheidsprestaties van ondernemingen in 
ontwikkelingseconomieën in Oost-Azië na de financiële crisis. Meer specifiek onderzoeken we in 
drie studies de determinanten en de effecten van duurzaamheidsprestaties.  
De eerste studie onderzoekt het effect van de structuur van de raad van bestuur op de economische, 
milieutechnische en sociale dimensies van de duurzaamheidsprestaties van ondernemingen vanuit 
het perspectief van de principaal-agenttheorie en stakeholder theorie. Onze analyse op basis van de 
‘triple bottom line’ laat niet alleen toe om te identificeren welke karakteristieken van de raad van 
bestuur een positief effect hebben op de duurzaamheid van ondernemingen, maar wijst ook uit dat 
sommige karakteristieken goed passen bij specifieke dimensies van duurzaamheid. De resultaten 
zijn relevant voor de praktijk omdat ze de rol van de raad van bestuur voor duurzaamheidsprestaties 
identificeren en een basis bieden voor de inspanningen die gedaan kunnen worden om duurzaam 
ondernemerschap te verbeteren. 
De tweede studie onderzoekt of managers in duurzame ondernemingen transparantere en meer 
betrouwbare informatie aanbieden aan hun stakeholders. We tonen aan dat duurzamere bedrijven 
minder gelinkt worden aan earnings management. Dit resultaat is in lijn met het ethische perspectief 
dat managers ertoe aanzet om hun stakeholders te voorzien van kwalitatieve financiële rapporten. 






stimulans is voor het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van financiële rapportering en dat het verbeteren 
van duurzaamheid in elk van haar drie dimensies een belangrijk middel is om earnings management 
te beperken. 
De derde studie verduidelijkt de relatie tussen de milieuprestaties en de financiële resultaten van 
ondernemingen via lineaire en kwadratische functies vanuit het standpunt van de stakeholder 
theorie. De resultaten tonen aan dat milieuprestaties een U-vormige relatie vertonen met financiële 
prestaties. Betere milieuprestaties leiden dus eerst tot een verslechtering  van financiële prestaties, 
maar na het bereiken van een kantelpunt, keert het effect om en leiden milieuprestaties uiteindelijk 
tot meer winstgevendheid en een hogere marktwaarde. Deze conclusies zijn belangrijk voor 
bedrijven, investeerders en beleidsmakers omdat ze de invloed van milieuprestaties in het verbeteren 
















Summary in English 
Sustainable development has attracted great attention over the last three decades since the first and 
most common definition that ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ was 
introduced in the Brundtland Report (1987). In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
sustainable development has emerged as a business approach to promote long-term survival and 
sustainability of business corporations in developed countries and spreading over emerging markets. 
Accordingly, the pursuit of sustainable development requires corporations to demonstrate their 
outstanding corporate sustainability performance in terms of economic development, environmental 
protection, and social responsibility. 
The dissertation mainly focuses on corporate sustainability performance in the emerging East Asian 
economies in the post global financial crisis. Particularly, we determine the determinants and the 
effects of corporate sustainability performance that are presented in the three studies as follows. 
The first study examines the influence of board structure on the economic, environmental, and social 
dimensions of corporate sustainability performance from the perspective of agency theory and 
stakeholder theory. Based on an analysis of the triple bottom line, our approach allows not only to 
identify which board attributes promote corporate sustainability performance but also to prove that 
some attributes fit well with some particular sustainability dimensions. Our findings have practical 
implications by identifying the role of corporate boards in corporate sustainability performance and 
providing a foundation for their efforts to enhance sustainable development. 
The second study investigates whether managers in sustainable firms provide their stakeholders with 
more transparent and reliable financial information. We provide evidence that firms with better 
sustainability performance are less likely to engage in earnings management. This finding is 
consistent with the ethical perspective that drives managers to provide their stakeholders with 
quality financial reports. Our study contributes to the literature by first demonstrating that corporate 
sustainability performance is a stimulus to enhance financial reporting quality and the improvement 






The third study aims to clarify the relationship between environmental performance and financial 
performance in both linear and quadratic functions through the lens of stakeholder theory. The 
findings prove that environmental performance has a U-shaped relationship with accounting-based 
and market-based financial performance. Accordingly, an increase in environmental performance 
deteriorates firm performance in the beginning, but after its threshold has been reached, the effect 
reverses and environmental performance ultimately serves profitability and market value. Our 
findings would be of interest to firms, investors, and policy makers by emphasizing the role of 








































1.1. Motivation and research objectives 
East Asia is an emerging region within the global system and achieves one of the most profound 
economic transformations in recorded history. In the 1960s, East Asia was a relatively poor 
developing region that accounted for only four percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). By 
the 1990s, East Asia, along with Europe and North America, became three core economic regions 
that together dominated the world economy (Dent, 2016). Nowadays, the economy in East Asia 
accounts for almost a quarter of the world GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2015). A number of 
East Asian countries host to the highest concentration of newly industrialized economies and 
become the world’s top 20 exporters in 2014 (China being the largest, Japan 4th, South Korea 7th, 
and Taiwan 20th).  
The rapid economic growth in East Asia, on the one hand, pushes development and increases 
welfare, but on the other hand, puts enormous pressure on the environment, natural resources, and 
society. The impacts of the key global challenges facing humanity in East Asia in the twenty-first 
century, such as environmental degradation, climate change, energy security, resource scarcity, 
social instability, and infrastructure failure, are of growing vital importance (Dent, 2016). The World 
Bank (2013) estimates that sixteen of the world’s most-polluted cities are located in China. China 
is also the world’s current largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Moreover, World Health Organization 
(2014) states air quality in Taiwan is the worst of the four Asian tigers. Seoul, as the capital of South 
Korea, is near the top of the list of Asian cities with certifiably unhealthy air. All current disastrous 
consequences sound the alarm of responsibility for the environment, workforce, and community 
over this decade. 
After the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, the emerging East Asian countries have increasingly 
paid attention to sustainable development. The Chinese government’s twelfth five-year plan that 
focuses on rebalancing the economy, mitigating social inequity, and conserving the environment 
was implemented in 2011. In the first half of 2009, South Korea formulated the national strategy on 
green growth and a five-year green growth plan for its implementation. Furthermore, the Korean 
national strategy for sustainable development was adopted in 2011-2015. Taiwan also set up the 
voluntary Green Factory Label system in 2011 that requires conservation of energy resources, green 






to corporations in East Asia, sustainable development has emerged as a business approach to ensure 
corporations’ long-term survival and competitive advantages whereby corporations seek to 
demonstrate their outstanding outcomes in economic development, environmental protection, and 
social responsibility (Galbreath, 2018). Accordingly, a study on corporate sustainability 
performance in the emerging East Asian markets in the post global financial crisis is pressing. 
The dissertation examines the determinants and the effects of corporate sustainability performance 
in the emerging East Asian economies in the post global financial crisis. It is argued that all policies 
on corporate sustainability performance have emanated from a board of directors, so that we focus 
on board attributes as the main determinants of corporate sustainability performance in the first 
study. Since financial reporting is an important part of a communication process between firms and 
all their stakeholders, we address the effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial 
reporting quality in the second study. We also clarify the role of corporate environmental 
performance, as a dimension of corporate sustainability performance, in enhancing financial 
performance in the third study. 
 
1.2. Data and sample 
We utilize information on corporate sustainability performance in the Asset4 ESG database of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. Thomson Reuters ESG ratings are designed to measure a firm’s 
relative ESG performance by considering a comprehensive evaluation of the firm’s sustainability 
processes and outcomes based on the reported data in the public domain, including company 
websites, news sources, annual reports, non-governmental organization websites, stock exchange 
fillings, and corporate social responsibility reports (Eliwa et al., 2019). As an international and 
diversified dataset, DataStream covers approximate 4,000 global firms and reports a wide range of 
data related to firms’ actual ESG performance. Up to now, there has been widespread use of Asset4 
ESG in empirical researches (e.g., Braam and Peeters, 2018; Drempetic et al., 2019; Dyck et al. 
2019; Eding and Scholtens, 2017; Eliwa et al., 2019; Gandullia and Piserà, 2019; Graafland and 






The ESG ratings are based on over 600 individual data points and 214 key performance indicators 
to provide scores on economic, environmental, and social performance at the firm-year level, as 
shown in Figure 1.1. Each performance score of a certain firm is calculated by equally weighting 
and z-scoring all related underlying data points and comparing it to other firms in the ESG data. In 
particular, economic performance reflects a firm’s overall financial health and measures its capacity 
to generate a high return on investment, sustainable growth, and long-term shareholder value by 
using all its resources and management practices efficiently. Next, environmental performance 
measures a firm’s impact on complete ecosystems and natural systems and reflects its capacity to 
generate shareholder value by capitalizing on environmental opportunities and avoiding 
environmental risks. Moreover, social performance measures a firm’s capacity to generate loyalty 
and trust with its employees, customers, suppliers, and society and reflects its reputation and the 
health of its license to operate in order to generate shareholder value in the long term. The score 
varies from zero to a hundred percent and a higher score is better.  
Figure1.1 The economic, environmental, and social performance scores in Asset4 ESG 
 
We focus our studies on the period of 2011-2016 when sustainable development has gained 
increasing attention in the emerging East Asian markets. According to the classification of Morgan 
More than 600 data points 







214 key performance indicators (KPIs) 
56 KPIs in 03 
economic categories 
70 KPIs in 03 
environmental categories 
88 KPIs in 07  
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Stanley Capital International (MSCI, 2016), the emerging East Asian countries include China, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. We obtain an initial sample of 350 firms (100 from China, 116 from South 
Korea, and 134 from Taiwan) that are available in DataStream from 2011-2016. The sampling firms 
account for approximately 40 percent of the total market capitalization in mainland China and also 
over 50 percent of the market capitalization of Shanghai Stock Exchange, represent nearly 70 
percent of the total market capitalization in South Korea, and retain over 80 percent of Taiwan’s 
market capitalization in 2016. Accordingly, the number of firms in the sample represent a majority 
of total market capitalization. Most of the sampling firms are relatively large and belong to a variety 
of industries; thus the influences of the firms and their corporate sustainability performance on the 
environment, natural resources, and the community are likely to be considerable. As a consequence, 
our sample is representative of the population of listed firms in the emerging East Asian markets 
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Sustainable development has a long tradition in developed economies but has been less considered 
in developing countries. However, during recent years, sustainable development has gained 
increasing attention in emerging markets. Its particular importance for the emerging economies is 
based on the ambitious effects of economic growth. On the one hand, the economic growth pushes 
development and increases welfare. On the other hand, it can put enormous pressure on the 
environment and natural resources (e.g., a loss of biodiversity, environmental degradation, and 
pollution) and society (e.g., social instability, infrastructure failure, and the exploitation of workers). 
All current disastrous consequences sound the alarm of firms’ responsibility for the environment, 
workforce, and community over this decade. Accordingly, sustainable development has emerged as 
a business approach to ensure firms’ long-term survival and competitive advantages whereby firms 
seek to demonstrate their outstanding outcomes in economic development, environmental 
protection, and social responsibility (Galbreath, 2018). It is a necessity of achieving economic, 
environmental, and social corporate objectives simultaneously, unless the goals of sustainable 
development are undermined (Hahn et al., 2010). 
The 2008 global financial crisis prompted firms to raise their awareness of ethical operations and 
corporate governance (Rossouw, 2012). The increasing responsibility and accountability to 
shareholders and wider community encourage firms to improve their corporate governance quality 
(Amran et al., 2014). The fact is that a board of directors plays the most important role in the 
governance structure of a business corporation. As the bridge of shareholders and management, a 
board of directors is a representative of a firm in the community with the highest level decision-
making authority to ratify and monitor the firm’s most important corporate decisions and to wield 
their enormous power over the firm’s strategic direction and resource allocation (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). In view of that, in the 2014 Asian Roundtable on corporate governance, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) emphasizes the fundamental importance of a 
good board of directors who act as the ultimate internal monitor in Asian firms recent years.  
The emergence of sustainable development and the prominence of corporate boards in the post 2008 
global financial crisis motivate us to investigate whether a good board of directors plays a vital role 






Asian economies where their geographical area, their range of cultural and social values, and their 
existing legal systems and law enforcement have been influencing their sustainable development 
decision making. For instance, compared to firms in western countries, Asian firms tend to focus 
more on economic rationales than noneconomic, ethical, or legal rationales (Hou et al., 2016). 
Besides, East Asia is of particular interest for high concentration of ownership and control of firms 
by the state or families, weak legal systems, and traditional lack of disclosure and transparency in 
corporate governance that are expected to reduce board effectiveness (Scholtens and Kang, 2013). 
Our study concerns the period of 2011-2016 when emerging countries in East Asia have emphasized 
the importance of sustainable development in the new era, such as the Chinese government’s 12th 
five-year plan in 2011, the Korean national strategy for sustainable development (2011-2015), and 
the introduction of Taiwan green factory label system in 2011.  
We extend the existing literature by investigating the influence of board structure on the economic, 
environmental, and social dimensions of corporate sustainability performance. There has been the 
growing literature on corporate governance and sustainable development and the strong theoretical 
and empirical link between the two terms. Most empirical studies have focused on the effects of 
corporate governance attributes on sustainability reporting and disclosure. For instance, Michelon 
and Parbonetti (2012) examine the relationship between different board characteristics and 
sustainability disclosure; Amran et al. (2014) investigate the role of corporate boards in 
sustainability reporting quality; or Hussain et al. (2018) identify which governance mechanisms 
foster the sustainability dimensions in sustainability reports. Although there is a close relationship 
between sustainability performance and sustainability disclosure (Hummel and Schlick, 2016), their 
definitions are distinctive. In particular, sustainability performance refers to the actual activities 
related to sustainable development strategies conducted by a firm, whereas sustainability disclosure 
is the channel to announce these activities to its stakeholders (Eliwa et al., 2019). Until now, the 
influence of corporate governance attributes on sustainability performance, instead of sustainability 
reporting and disclosure, has been ignored. If the corporate commitment to sustainable development 
is to satisfy environmental and social needs and to develop long-term relationships with stakeholders 
for sustainable business, then it is expected that a good board of directors would demonstrate their 






Additionally, we add to the scarce literature on the non-linear relationship between board size and 
corporate sustainability performance. From a review of the literature, previous studies have used a 
linear function to focus on the sign (negative, positive, or neutral) of the relationship between board 
size and multidimensional sustainability. For instance, Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
indicate that board size negatively influences environmental disclosure; de Villiers et al. (2011) find 
out the positive impact of board size on environmental performance; or Hussain et al. (2018) are 
unable to observe any significant relationship between the number of directors on board and all three 
sustainability dimensions. However, the linear relationships do not always fit all cases. This can be 
explained that expanding the number of board directors would provide more extensive expertise, 
more perspectives on corporate strategies, and less concentration of power problems but might 
significantly inhibit board processes (van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004), suggesting the non-linear 
relation between board size and sustainability. Thus we investigate the impact of board size on the 
three dimensions of sustainability performance by using both linear and quadratic functions in order 
to address the shape of the relationship between board size and corporate sustainability performance 
more accurately. 
We find empirical evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between board size and the 
environmental dimension of sustainability performance. Accordingly, an increase in the number of 
board directors can enhance environmental performance until its threshold is reached, then the 
direction reverses and environmental performance deteriorates. This implies that a corporate board 
should not be too large in order to operate effectively. Though, we observe the linear and positive 
relationship between the number of board directors and the social sustainability dimension, 
indicating that expanding board size would linearly improve social performance. Besides, we 
provide strong evidence that the proportion of independent directors on board positively affects 
environmental and social sustainability performance. The findings suggest that independent 
directors bring new perspectives on corporate environmental and social responsibilities to a board 
of directors and encourage firms in the improvement of environmental and social sustainability 
performance to be good corporate citizenship. However, we reveal that the separation of CEO and 
board chair roles has no impact on all three sustainability dimensions. Our study would be of interest 






dimensions of sustainability performance and providing a foundation for their efforts to enhance 
sustainable development.   
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature and develops our 
research hypothesis. Section 2.3 discusses the research methodology. The results are presented in 
Section 2.4. The final Section 2.5 concludes and discusses the results. 
 
2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.2.1. Literature review 
The term ‘sustainable development’ in the business context comes from the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (1992), that is “adopting business strategies and activities that meet 
the needs of the enterprise and its stakeholders today while protecting, sustaining, and enhancing 
the human and natural resources that will be needed in the future”. Accordingly, Elkington (1998) 
introduces sustainability as the triple bottom line that incorporates three dimensions of performance, 
including economic, environmental, and social. The economic dimension is related to not only 
“firm-centric aspect of financial performance” but also “economic interests of external stakeholder, 
such as broad-based improvement in economic well-being and standards of living” (Sheth et al., 
2011: 24). This view has been emanated from the 2008 global financial crisis with serious 
consequences for the community (e.g., prolonged collapse of asset market, widespread 
unemployment, steadily declining output, explosion of government debt) that bring deep and urgent 
attention to economic sustainability (Choi and Ng, 2011). The environmental dimension of 
sustainability has become increasingly important to firms and stakeholders since World 
Environment Day was established by the United Nations in 1972 to raise the awareness of the whole 
community about global environmental issues. Since corporate ethics is considered as an indelible 
feature of stakeholder engagement (Fombrun and Foss, 2004), the social dimension of sustainability 
has become more apparent with the growing concern about the well-being of workforce, people, 






A more recent strand of the literature deals with the linkage between corporate governance and 
sustainable development. Aras and Crowther (2008) investigate the FTSE 100 firms and their 
corporate governance policies to explore the relationship between governance and sustainability. 
Four aspects of sustainability are recognised, namely societal influence, environmental impact, 
organisational culture, and finance, under the assumption of their equal importance. As a 
consequence, the majority of the sampling firms do not understand or are not interested in this 
relationship, whereas only seven percent of firms have corporate governance policies with a full 
connection to sustainability. Similarly, Kolk (2008) analyses Fortune Global 250 sustainability 
reports and reflects a growing awareness about the correlation between corporate governance and 
sustainability. However, a lot of firms are still unclear about how to spell out and disclose this 
relationship fully. 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) examine the relationship between different board characteristics 
and sustainability disclosure among US and European firms through the lens of stakeholder theory. 
It is argued that policies on sustainability disclosure have emanated from a board of directors and 
both can enhance organizational legitimacy. They find evidence that community influential 
members are positively associated with sustainability disclosure whereas there is no impact of the 
proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, and the presence of sustainability committee on 
this disclosure. Furthermore, Amran et al. (2014) base on legitimacy and resource-based theories to 
identify the influence of governance structure on sustainability reporting quality in the Asia-Pacific 
region. They indicate an insignificant role of corporate boards, including board size, board 
independence, and gender diversity, in upholding the credibility of sustainability reports. 
More recently, Hussain et al. (2018) identify which corporate governance mechanisms foster each 
dimension of triple bottom line sustainability performance under the perspective of agency theory 
and stakeholder theory. They follow the Global Reporting Initiative framework to measure 
sustainability practices through manual content analysis on sustainability reports of US firms. 
Consequently, there is no significant relationship between all governance characteristics and 
economic sustainability and no impact of board size on all the three dimensions. However, they find 
strong evidence that most of governance attributes, including board independence, CEO duality, 
women on board, board meeting, and sustainability committee, play a vital role in improving 






In our general view, some existing papers have applied qualitative methods to consider firms’ 
awareness about the correlation between governance and sustainability. Other quantitative papers 
have focused on the effect of corporate governance attributes on sustainability disclosure. However, 
the relationship between board structure and corporate sustainability performance has not been fully 
understood. Furthermore, there has been no empirical investigation that examines the non-linear 
relationship between corporate governance and sustainability. Our study attempts to address these 
limitations. We extend the prior literature by providing a complete understanding of the relationship 
between the main board characteristics and all three dimensions of corporate sustainability 
performance. In addition, based on the theoretical framework, we attempt to clarify the impact of 
board size, as an board attribute, on corporate sustainability performance by using both linear and 
quadratic functions. 
 
2.2.2. Hypothesis development 
Agency theory posits that a conflicting relationship between shareholders and management is almost 
inevitable in firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It can be explained by the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers, the presence of information asymmetry, and the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and management where managers exploit their control over firm operations to pursue 
their short-term interests at the expense of shareholders’ long-term interests, thereby creating agency 
costs. Keeping in view sustainable development, management tend to prefer conservative initiatives 
with immediate interests whereas shareholders desire a high level of sustainable development with 
long-term benefits, thus causing a potential agency problem between shareholders and management 
in pursuing sustainable development (de Villiers et al., 2011). 
Agency theory also contends that one of the primary functions of a corporate board is monitoring 
management to ensure that managers operate in the interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). An effective monitoring function reduces managers’ discretion, curbs managers’ 
opportunism, holds managers accountable for their activities, and aligns the goals of management 
with those of shareholders, therefore reduces the agency conflicts (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Hence, a good board of directors is a basic necessity of most firms to improve the monitoring of 






mechanism to curtail such managerial ‘opportunism’ is the board of directors”. Accordingly, in view 
of sustainable development, a good corporate board would promote sustainability performance and 
be vigilant in monitoring management decisions on sustainable development strategies. 
Nevertheless, the agency theory framework would seem unable to fully explain the relationship 
between a board of directors and sustainability performance (Hussain et al., 2018). It is argued that 
“companies increasingly use CSR committees does not explain why they do so and in which 
direction CSR governance structures might evolve” (Spitzeck, 2009: 502), thus expose the limitation 
of agency theory to cover all the aspects of this relationship. Following a review of the literature 
(e.g., Hussain et al., 2018; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), we adopt agency theory and stakeholder 
theory to fully understand the correlation between governance mechanisms and sustainability. 
Hussain et al. (2018) argue that both theories advocate the alignment of management, shareholders, 
and stakeholders, thus tend to complement each other. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) broaden their 
view on governance and sustainability from protecting shareholders’ interests to enhancing relations 
with all stakeholders. Hence, they add a perspective of stakeholders to an agency-centred view on 
this relation. 
Under stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), stakeholder engagement is of critical importance for 
firms to build and enhance their organizational legitimacy to operate. Accordingly, firms manage 
their legitimacy to signal to various stakeholders that their performance is legitimate and appropriate 
(Suchman, 1995). Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) consider good corporate governance and 
sustainability as complementary mechanisms of legitimacy for better relations with stakeholders. 
They also argue that all corporate policies emanate from a board of directors, hence a corporate 
board could be a determinant of sustainable development strategies. 
Recent researches (e.g., Chen and Wang, 2011) indicate that firms nowadays have been put under 
increasing pressure from the variety of stakeholder groups to be sustainable. This leads to an 
improvement on a view of corporate governance, from accountability to only shareholders to 
responsibility for all  stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2008), in which a board of directors reigns supreme 
with their duty to align management-stakeholder goals (Hill and Jones, 1992). As stated by van den 
Berghe and Levrau (2004), a board of directors not only the bridge of shareholders and management 






can use sustainable development as the long-term strategies to respond to their stakeholders’ 
expectations. 
Taken together, although no ideal corporate governance can provide a full guarantee of immunity 
from social and environmental disasters, a good board of directors is expected to play a vital role in 
enhancing sustainability performance. Prior literature widely provides some key attributes for a 
good board of directors. In particular, van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) determine three main 
board characteristics that are most frequently used in a large academic literature to appropriately 
structure a corporate board. They are board size that refers to the number of directors on board; 
board composition that refers to the proportion of independent directors; and board leadership 
structure that refers to the separation of CEO and chairperson. Therefore, we focus our study on the 
three board characteristics, namely board size, board independence, and board leadership structure, 
and investigate their influences on each dimension of corporate sustainability performance. 
Board size and corporate sustainability performance 
Board size can exert an influence on a corporate board’s ability to function effectively. From the 
perspective of agency theory, expanding the number of directors on board is detrimental to 
governance efficiency (Hussain et al., 2018). It is commonly argued that a smaller corporate board 
is a good monitor since the board of directors are likely to be more cohesive and more productive 
to monitor the agent more effectively (Coles et al., 2008). When the size of the board becomes 
bigger, potential group dynamics problems have been arisen such as social loafing, high 
coordination and communication costs, and high risk to develop factions and coalitions (Goodstein 
et al., 1994). Accordingly, the corporate board would neglect their control and monitoring duties 
and involve an inadequate perception of the true executive function (Beiner et al., 2004). However, 
each director in a smaller board suffers from higher workload and responsibilities, that might hinder 
the effectiveness of their monitoring tasks as compared to a larger board (John and Senbet, 1998). 
An increase in board size provides more extensive expertise, more management capacity, more 
perspectives on corporate strategies, and less concentration of power problems in order to monitor 






In accordance with stakeholder theory, a large corporate board is representative of diverse interests 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001) that bring balanced decision-making and better social capital. In addition, 
a larger board is more likely to possess prestigious directors who have diversified experience and 
background knowledge and offer better advice to the management (Dalton et al., 1999). Evidence 
shows that the quality of board advice might be impaired if they are emanated from a small corporate 
board with a lack of expertise. In terms of corporate sustainable development, it is expected that a 
larger board would include more directors who are more concerned about environmental and social 
issues and have expertise on corporate sustainability performance (Jizi, 2017). These directors are 
well placed to spread their interest in sustainable development, apply their expertise to follow 
sustainable development strategies, provide advice on sustainability matters, and facilitate access to 
the relevant resources. 
Based on the arguments above, we suggest that a larger board is more likely to conduct their 
monitoring and advising tasks effectively, thus enhance corporate sustainability performance. 
However, when the board size becomes too large, the effectiveness of their critical functions of 
monitoring and advising management would decrease. We hypothesise the relationship as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: The number of board directors is inversely U-shaped related to corporate 
sustainability performance. 
H1a: The number of board directors is inversely U-shaped related to the economic dimension of 
corporate sustainability performance. 
H1b: The number of board directors is inversely U-shaped related to the environmental dimension 
of corporate sustainability performance. 
H1c: The number of board directors is inversely U-shaped related to the social dimension of 
corporate sustainability performance. 
Board independence and corporate sustainability performance 
Board directors are legally responsible for monitoring the initiatives of management. To monitor 






considered to be necessary (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). Independent directors not only have a 
function of monitoring the agent’s decisions to avoid possible behaviours that mainly pursue 
personal enrichment objectives but also play an important role in strictly complying with the law 
and protecting minority shareholders’ interests (Naciti, 2019). In addition, the advisory role of a 
board is normally more performed by independent directors who bring expertise and experience to 
a board of directors and provide quality advice to management (Coles et al., 2008). Since 
independent directors on board hold more power over management and are not dependent on 
management, the presence of independent directors would increase the effectiveness of a board’s 
monitoring and advising tasks.  
Given the importance of sustainable development, an independent board is expected to extend their 
exclusive focus on financial performance to the concern over the environment and society. Agency 
theory implies that the higher concentration of independent directors in a corporate board can reduce 
agency costs since independent directors have a lower potential for conflict of interests. Agency 
theory also suggests that an independent governing board can monitor the decisions and actions of 
the agent effectively. Therefore, independent directors who tend to exploit the potential of long-
term investments in sustainable development would require management to support such 
investments and objectively use their knowledge and expertise to promote, govern, and monitor 
management practices on sustainability performance (de Villiers et al., 2011).  
In the stakeholder theory framework, external directors, in comparison with internal ones, are less 
subjected to pressure from shareholders and management but are put under more pressure from other 
stakeholder groups. Independent directors are more likely to be sensitive to the stakeholders’ 
demand and therefore be conscious of sustainability performance (de Villiers et al., 2011). 
Moreover, independent directors who are external to their firm, responsible for a wide audience, and 
representative of high transparency would try to protect their own reputation in the community for 
the continued director appointments (Hussain et al., 2018). They are supposed to feel unrestrained 
in advocating their firm to acquire sustainable development.  
Consistent with the arguments on board independence, we expect that independent directors can 






Hypothesis 2: The proportion of independent directors on board is positively related to corporate 
sustainability performance. 
H2a: The proportion of independent directors on board is positively related to the economic 
dimension of corporate sustainability performance. 
H2b: The proportion of independent directors on board is positively related to the environmental 
dimension of corporate sustainability performance. 
H2c: The proportion of independent directors on board is positively related to the social dimension 
of corporate sustainability performance. 
Board leadership structure and corporate sustainability performance 
Board leadership structure in terms of CEO duality focuses on the combination of CEO and board 
chair roles that is assigned to a single person (Hussain et al., 2018). The appointment of a CEO as a 
board chairperson indicates their managerial power with the possession of significant proportion of 
shares and/or the successful career records (Jizi, 2017). Agency theory posits that a corporate board 
has a task of monitoring management’s decisions to protect shareholders’ rights. When the two roles 
of a CEO and a chair are combined, the boundary between control and management becomes blurred 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). This combination constrains board independence from management, 
creates agency problems due to increased information asymmetry between a CEO and a board of 
directors, and serves weak monitoring function of a corporate board (de Villers et al., 2011).  
The separation of CEO and board chair roles would dilute the power of the CEO, limit abuse of 
power, and reduce the domination of management (van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). A board of 
directors can control managerial opportunism, raise the awareness of management’s responsibility, 
and increase their accountability and transparency to stakeholders (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). 
Hence, there is a need to split these two roles. From this perspective, the separation of CEO and 
board chair roles would mitigate the tension between managers, who want to maximize short-term 
financial gains at the expense of environmental and social investments, and board members, who 
support investments in the long-term sustainable development. We expect that the separation of 






Hypothesis 3: The separation of CEO and board chair roles is positively related to corporate 
sustainability performance. 
H3a: The separation of CEO and board chair roles is positively related to the economic dimension 
of corporate sustainability performance. 
H3b: The separation of CEO and board chair roles is positively related to the environmental 
dimension of corporate sustainability performance. 
H3c: The separation of CEO and board chair roles is positively related to the social dimension of 
corporate sustainability performance. 
 
2.3. Research method 
2.3.1. Data and sample selection 
We start with information on corporate sustainability performance in the Asset4 ESG database of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. Up to now, there has been widespread use of the Asset4 ESG ratings 
in empirical researches (e.g., Braam and Peeters, 2018; Cheng et al., 2014; Drempetic et al., 2019; 
Eding and Scholtens, 2017; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Mervelskemper and Streit, 2017). 
DataStream is an international and diversified dataset that covers approximate 4,000 global firms 
and reports a wide range of data related to firms’ actual ESG performance. Based on over 600 
individual data points and 214 key performance indicators, the ESG ratings provide scores on 
economic, environmental, and social performance at the firm-year level. Each performance score of 
a certain firm is calculated by equally weighting and z-scoring all related underlying data points and 
comparing it to other firms in DataStream. The score varies from zero to a hundred percent and a 
higher score is better.  
All data related to corporate sustainability performance, boards of directors, and financial 
information have been collected from DataStream. According to the classification of Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI, 2016), the emerging East Asian countries include China, South 






Korea, and 134 from Taiwan) that are available in DataStream from 2011-2016. The sampling firms 
account for approximately 40 percent of the total market capitalization in mainland China and also 
over 50 percent of the market capitalization of Shanghai Stock Exchange, represent nearly 70 
percent of the total market capitalization in South Korea, and retain over 80 percent of Taiwan’s 
market capitalization in 2016. We exclude 65 financial firms from the sample because of their 
distinctive characteristics compared to non-financial firms, and thus obtain 1,710 firm-year 
observations from 2011 to 2016. We further eliminate 114 firm-year observations due to insufficient 
ESG data. A final unbalanced panel data ends up with of 1,596 firm-year observations in the three 
emerging East Asian markets from 2011-2016.  
 
2.3.2. Variable measurement 
Dependent variables: Corporate sustainability performance 
We use the scores on economic, environmental, and social performance at the firm-year level that 
are provided by DataStream to measure each dimension of corporate sustainability performance. In 
particular, economic performance reflects a firm’s overall financial health and measures its capacity 
to generate a high return on investment, sustainable growth, and long-term shareholder value by 
using all its resources and management practices efficiently. Next, environmental performance 
measures a firm’s impact on complete ecosystems and natural systems and reflects its capacity to 
generate shareholder value by capitalizing on environmental opportunities and avoiding 
environmental risks. Moreover, social performance measures a firm’s capacity to generate loyalty 
and trust with its employees, customers, suppliers, and society and reflects its reputation and the 
health of its license to operate in order to generate shareholder value in the long term. 
Independent variables: Board structure 
As discussed above, three attributes of board structure, including board size, board independence, 
and board leadership structure, are considered in our study. Board size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total number of directors on board. Next, board independence is determined by the 
proportion of board members who are independent. Board leadership structure is represented by a 







We control for firm financial characteristics including firm size, firm performance, and firm 
leverage that are most frequently used in large academic literature to link to sustainability (e.g., 
Hussain et al., 2018; Jizi, 2017; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Naciti, 2019). 
Larger firms are more likely to be under pressure from stakeholders and society or from the public 
authority and government regulatory agencies to be sustainable (Chan et al., 2014). In addition, the 
diversification of geographical position and product markets requires large firms to gain a reputation 
with their sustainability performance (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars (Hussain et al., 2018; Jizi, 2017). 
A positive relationship between firm performance and sustainability performance is predicted. A 
firm gives priority to the claims of financial stakeholders over the claims of social stakeholders 
(Cowen et al., 1987), thus good financial performance gives rise to sustainability performance. We 
control firm performance by using the rate of return on the book value of total assets (Hussain et al., 
2018; Naciti, 2019). 
Firms that rely on more external funding from creditors are unlikely to satisfy the expectations of 
other stakeholders (Chan et al., 2014). Since creditors are more powerful stakeholders, management 
tends to respond to creditors and address their expectation for on-time payment rather than to support 
the claims of less powerful stakeholders (Artiach et al., 2010). We control for firm leverage, as total 
debts divided by total assets (de Villers et al., 2011; Naciti, 2019).  











Table 2.1 Measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
Name of variable Code Measurement 
Dependent variables  
Economic performance CSP1 Economic performance score  
Environmental performance CSP2 Environmental performance score  
Social performance CSP3 Social performance score  
Independent variables   
Board size BSIZE Natural logarithm of number of directors on board 
Board independence INDP Percentage of independent directors on board 
Board leadership structure LEAD 1 if CEO is not a board chair; 0 otherwise 
Control variables  
Firm size FSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars 
Firm performance ROA Return on the book value of total assets 
Firm leverage LEV Total debts divided by total assets 
 
2.3.3. Empirical model 
We begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification to determine an appropriate 
multivariate statistical method in our study. We first specify CSP (represents CSP1, CSP2, and CSP3) 
as a function of board structure (includes BSIZE, INDP, and LEAD) and the control variables 
(abbreviated as X) for the ith firm in year t, in addition to an error term uit as shown in Equation 1. 
Equation 1: CSPit = β1 * BSIZEit + β2 * INDPit + β3 * LEADit + β4 * Xit + uit 
The linear model is extended into quadratic functional form of regression model to investigate the 
non-linear relationship between BSIZE and CSP. We incorporate a quadratic term of BSIZE into 
Equation 1 to build the quadratic function in which BSIZE works as the predictor and the moderator.  
Equation 2: CSPit = β1 * BSIZEit + β2 * BSIZEit






Since each firm in the panel data is observed in different years, the error term uit in Equation 2 is 
possibly not independent across time (Greene, 2000). Time-dependent macroeconomic factors such 
as government policy or systemic shocks could have effects on corporate sustainability 
performance. Accordingly, time effects on CSP would be a systematic component to be embedded 
in the error term uit and cause the potential for residual serial correlation of the error term across 
observations over time. We include yearly dummy variables (Zt) to control for time effects as shown. 
Equation 3: CSPit = β1* BSIZEit + β2* BSIZEit
2 + β3* INDPit + β4* LEADit + β5* Xit + β6* Zt  + eit 
There is still probability that the error term eit in Equation 3 would not be independent within firms. 
A certain firm performs systematically differently compared with others owing to its long-term and 
nontransient characteristics over time (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). Individual-specific variant and 
time invariant unobserved effects on CSP that cause unobserved heterogeneity in the panel 
estimation would be a component of eit. Hence we incorporate individual-specific variant and time 
invariant unobserved effects into the specification by decomposing eit in Equation 3 into firm effects 
(αi) and idiosyncratic error (Ɛit).  
Equation 4: CSPit= β1* BSIZEit+ β2* BSIZEit
2+ β3* INDPit + β4* LEADit + β5* Xit + β6* Zt + αi+ Ɛit 
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the sample distribution of our sample by year and country (Panel A) and by 
industry and country (Panel B). As shown in Panel A, the sample distribution across countries is 
reasonable: 25.9 percent of the sample are in China, 33.4 percent are in South Korea, and 40.7 
percent are in Taiwan. The number of firms in the sample has increased from 2011 to 2016 in all 
three countries as a positive sign for an effort to pursue sustainable development in the emerging 
East Asian markets in recent years. In panel B, according to the Industry Classification Benchmark, 
the most heavily represented industry in our sample is Industrials (34.3 percent), followed by 






Table 2.2 Sample distribution 
Panel A. Distribution of firm-year observations by year and country 
  Country  Total 
Year  China S. Korea Taiwan  Observations In percent 
2011  65 78 102  245 15.4 
2012  65 82 105  252 15.8 
2013  67 85 107  259 16.2 
2014  71 90 110  271 17.0 
2015  73 99 112  284 17.8 
2016  73 99 113  285 17.9 
Total  414 533 649  1,596 100.0 
Panel B. Distribution of firm-year observations by industry and country 
  Country  Total 
Industry  China S. Korea Taiwan  Observations In percent 
Oil and gas  30 12 12  54 3.4 
Basic materials  84 54 71  209 13.1 
Industrials  163 196 188  547 34.3 
Consumer goods  52 129 82  263 16.5 
Health care   21 15 9  45 2.8 
Consumer services   18 56 37  111 7.0 
Telecommunications   6 18 22  46 2.9 
Utilities   26 12 0  38 2.4 
Technology  14 41 228  283 17.7 
Total  414 533 649  1,596 100.0 
 
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables for 
the full sample. All continuous control variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentile to 
control for the outlier effect. Meanwhile, since the scores of sustainability performance are z-scored 






of the dependent variables. We also keep the value of independent variables that represent three 
attributes of board structure. 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables    
CSP1 1,596 42.84 29.83 1.25 98.43 
CSP2 1,596 54.17 31.79 9.29 95.29 
CSP3 1,596 47.74 33.35 4.11 96.51 
Independent variables    
BSIZE 1,596 2.24 0.33 1.39 3.26 
INDP 1,596 37.60 18.84 0.00 93.33 
LEAD 1,596 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Control variables    
FSIZE  1,596 15.59 1.33 12.30 18.96 
Total assets in billion US dollars 1,596 14.40 26.10 0.22 171.00 
ROA 1,596 5.20 5.84 -13.86 24.45 
LEV 1,596 25.72 17.03 0.00 67.92 
 
The mean scores of economic, environmental, and social performance are 42.84 percent, 54.17 
percent, and 47.74 percent, respectively. These figures indicate that firms in the sample generally 
promote good sustainability performance, especially on the environmental dimension. Furthermore, 
the scores of the three sustainability dimensions exhibit relatively high standard deviation and wide 
range of value, that suggests different sustainability initiatives between East Asian firms in the post 
global financial crisis. 
For the independent variables, BSIZE is the natural logarithm of number of board directors with the 
mean of 2.24 and the range from 1.39 to 3.26. In other words, corporate boards in our sample have 
approximately ten board directors on average with a minimum of four and a maximum of twenty 
six members. While it is highly recommended that a board should be controlled by more than fifty 






East Asian firms is 37.60 percent on average. In addition, the mean value of LEAD of 0.35 indicates 
that more firms in the sample have the CEO also serving as the board chairperson. These figures 
imply that the majority of sample firms has not satisfied the criteria for a good board of directors 
according to the best corporate governance practices.   
For the control variables, firm size equals 15.59 (equivalent to total assets of 14.4 billion US dollars) 
on average, ranging from 12.30 (220 thousand US dollars) to 18.96 (171 billion US dollars). The 
mean value of ROA is positive and equals 5.20 percent with the standard deviation of 5.84 percent. 
The ratio of total debts to total assets is 25.72 percent on average and ranges from 0 to 67.92 percent. 
Table 2.4 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix between variables. As shown, the pairwise 
relationships between the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of corporate 
sustainability performance are positive and significant. This is evidence that East Asian firms 
achieve economic, environmental, and social corporate objectives simultaneously in order to pursue 
the goals of sustainable development. 
We examine whether there are multicollinearity problems between the independent variables and 
control variables by using matrix correlation and running the variance inflation factor (VIF). The 
unconditional correlations are generally moderate in magnitude. In addition, no independent 
variables and control variables have VIF greater than 10, which is the generally accepted range for 
individual variables (Kennedy, 1998). We therefore conclude that there is no potential threat of 




Table 2.4 Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables 
 VIF CSP1 CSP2 CSP3 BSIZE INDP LEAD FSIZE ROA LEV 
CSP1  1         
CSP2  0.694*** 1        
CSP3  0.766*** 0.891*** 1       
BSIZE 1.11 -0.017 0.020 0.034 1      
INDP 1.19 0.248*** 0.203*** 0.224*** -0.084*** 1     
LEAD 1.01 0.064** 0.109*** 0.099*** -0.065*** 0.103*** 1    
FSIZE 1.36 0.342*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 0.239*** 0.353*** 0.000 1   
ROA 1.20 0.111*** -0.138*** -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.055** -0.008 -0.181*** 1  
LEV 1.31 -0.099*** 0.088*** 0.030 0.186*** 0.085*** -0.019 0.328*** -0.402*** 1 




2.4.2. Regression results 
The regression results of the correlation between board structure and each dimension of corporate 
sustainability performance are presented in this section. We subject our findings in Model 1 and 
Model 2 by adding year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. We regress each sustainability 
dimension (CSP1, CSP2, and CSP3) on the base model of the three board attributes (BSIZE, INDP, 
and LEAD) by using a linear function in Model 1. Next we introduce the quadratic of BSIZE in 
Model 2 to consider the existence of a non-linear relationship between board size and corporate 
sustainability performance. 
In order to confirm the chosen methodology for the panel regression estimations, we conduct some 
robustness check to analyse statistical assumptions of the regression. We use F-test and reject the 
null hypothesis that all firm specific intercept αi equal zero. Hence, fixed effects model is more 
suitable than pooled OLS to alleviate individual heterogeneity. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test is also conducted to confirm that random effects model is better than pooled OLS to 
deal with heterogeneity. Then, we apply Hausman test and find out that fixed effects model is more 
relevant and significant than random effects model. We conclude that fixed effects model is the 
most appropriate for our panel regression. Fixed effects estimations also prevent some endogeneity 
problems that rely on the correlation between the time-invariant component of the error (αi) and the 
independent variables. In addition, Rogers’ (1993) cluster-robust standard errors at firm level is 
employed in the regression to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the panel data 
(Drukker, 2003).  
The relationship between board structure and economic sustainability performance 
Table 2.5 reports the regression results of the correlation between the three board attributes and the 
economic dimension of sustainability performance. In terms of board size, the result of Model 1 
suggests that, in the linear specification, the effect of BSIZE on CSP1 is positive (β=2.666) but 
insignificant. Thus there is no linear relationship between board size and economic performance. 
Furthermore, as shown in Model 2, the coefficients for the linear term and the quadratic term of 
BSIZE are all insignificant. These results imply that there is no impact of board size on economic 






The coefficients for INDP in both Model 1 and Model 2 are negative (β=-0.048 and β=-0.047 
respectively) but insignificant. This implies that there is no significant relationship between board 
independence and economic sustainability performance. We are unable to confirm Hypothesis 2a.  
The results also show that LEAD is found to be positively but insignificantly related to CSP1 in both 
two models. We conclude that contrary to Hypothesis 3a, the relationship between board leadership 
structure and the economic dimension of sustainability performance is not supported. 
Table 2.5 Regression results of board structure and economic sustainability performance 
 Model 1 - CSP1  Model 2 - CSP1 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
BSIZE 2.666 1.07  -4.517 -0.29 
BSIZE2    1.622 0.47 
INDP -0.048 -1.03  -0.047 -1.00 
LEAD 0.545 0.50  0.551 0.50 
FSIZE 3.561 1.52  3.582 1.52 
ROA 0.878*** 7.36  0.875*** 7.34 
LEV -0.291*** -4.25  -0.292*** -4.26 
Constant -26.948 -0.73  -19.524 -0.50 
Observations 1,596  1,596 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value 72.27***  66.29*** 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
Adj. R2 (within) 45.81  45.82 
Chi2 value (Hausman test) 25.73***  30.39*** 
Prob>chi2 0.007  0.002 
Model Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 






In terms of the control variables, FSIZE is positively but insignificantly associated with CSP1 in 
Model 1 and Model 2. This implies that there is no impact of firm size on the economic sustainability 
dimension. Next, we find a positive and significant relationship between ROA and CSP1 in both 
models. It is understandable when more profitable firms tend to have better economic sustainability 
performance. For the firm leverage variable, its coefficients in the CSP1 models are negative at the 
1% significance level. Hence firms with more debts are less likely to focus on the improvement of 
the economic dimension of corporate sustainability performance. 
The relationship between board structure and environmental sustainability performance 
Table 2.6 reports the regression results of the correlation between the three board attributes and the 
environmental dimension of sustainability performance. In terms of board size, the result of Model 
1 suggests that in the linear specification the effect of BSIZE on CSP2 is positive (β=6.469) at the 
1% significance level. This implies that there is a positive linear relationship between board size 
and environmental sustainability performance.  
Next, we introduce the quadratic of BSIZE in Model 2. The coefficient for the linear term of BSIZE 
is significantly positive and the coefficient for the quadratic term of BSIZE is significantly negative. 
This is strong evidence of a non-linear relationship between board size and environmental 
performance. The findings imply that an increase in board size can enhance environmental 
sustainability performance until a threshold level of BSIZE is reached. After that, a larger corporate 
board leads to a decrease in their environmental performance. The findings provide evidence in 
favour of Hypothesis 1b, which suggests an inverse U-shaped relationship between BSIZE and 
CSP2.  
The proportion of independent directors on board is significantly and positively related to 
environmental sustainability performance in both models (β=0.118 and β=0.114 respectively). 
These results support Hypothesis 2b that expects board independence to have a positive influence 
on environmental performance. We can conclude that independent directors on board are more 







The coefficients for LEAD in both Model 1 and Model 2 are negative (β=-1.659 and β=-1.687 
respectively) but insignificant. This implies that the separation of CEO and board chair roles has no 
influence on environmental performance. Hypothesis 3b is rejected.  
Table 2.6 Regression results of board structure and environmental sustainability performance 
 Model 1 - CSP2  Model 2 - CSP2 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
BSIZE 6.469*** 2.71  36.898** 2.30 
BSIZE2    -6.873* -1.91 
INDP 0.118** 2.53  0.114** 2.45 
LEAD -1.659 -1.22  -1.687 -1.24 
FSIZE 2.842 1.59  2.755 1.55 
ROA -0.114 -1.11  -0.103 -1.01 
LEV 0.023 0.29  0.025 0.32 
Constant -17.073 -0.61  -48.520 -1.52 
Observations 1,596  1,596 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value 31.41***  29.27*** 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
Adj. R2 (within) 40.93  41.15 
Chi2 value (Hausman test) 41.82***  45.87*** 
Prob>chi2 0.000  0.000 
Model Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors. 
In terms of the control variables, the coefficients for FSIZE in Model 1 and Model 2 is positive but 
insignificant. This implies that there is no relationship between firm size and the environmental 
sustainability dimension. Similarly, there is no significant impact of firm performance and firm 






The relationship between board structure and social sustainability performance 
Table 2.7 reports the regression results of the correlation between the three board attributes and the 
social dimension of sustainability performance. In terms of board size, the result of Model 1 
indicates that in the linear specification the effect of board size on social performance is positive 
(β=5.825) at the 5% significance level. We can conclude that expanding the number of directors on 
board would enhance social sustainability performance. 
We turn to the relation between BSIZE and CSP3 in a quadratic model. In Model 2, we find a positive 
coefficient for BSIZE (β=46.04) and a negative coefficient for its quadratic (β=-8.75). However, the 
results of the linear and quadratic BSIZE are not significant. A curvilinear, non-monotonic 
relationship between board size and social performance cannot be found. Thus we are unable to 
confirm Hypothesis 3a. 
Board independence is positively related to the social dimension of corporate sustainability 
performance at the 1% significance level in both models (β=0.119 and β=0.117 respectively). These 
results support Hypothesis 3b that expects the proportion of independent directors on board to have 
a positive influence on social performance. We can conclude that independent board directors are 
more likely to enhance social sustainability performance. 
The results show that the coefficients for LEAD in Model 1 and Model 2 are negative but 
insignificant. Contrary to Hypothesis 3c, the relationship between board leadership structure and 
social sustainability performance is not supported. Accordingly, the separation or combination of 
CEO and board chair roles is unlikely to influence the social sustainability dimension. 
In terms of the control variables, the coefficients for FSIZE in both models are positive but 
insignificant. This implies that there is no relationship between firm size and the social dimension 
of sustainability performance. Similarly, the coefficients for ROA and LEV in Model 1 and Model 
2 are negative but insignificant. We conclude that there is no significant impact of firm performance 







Table 2.7 Regression results of board structure and social sustainability performance  
 Model 1 - CSP3  Model 2 - CSP3 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
BSIZE 5.825** 2.22  15.043 0.88 
BSIZE2    -2.082 -0.57 
INDP 0.119*** 2.68  0.117*** 2.65 
LEAD -0.547 -0.44  -0.556 -0.44 
FSIZE 0.357 0.24  0.330 0.23 
ROA -0.126 -1.43  -0.123 -1.39 
LEV -0.015 -0.21  -0.015 -0.20 
Constant 17.814 0.77  8.288 0.28 
Observations 1,596  1,596 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value 30.01***  27.70*** 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000 
Adj. R2 (within) 37.78  37.80 
Chi2 value (Hausman test) 51.75***  60.25*** 
Prob>chi2 0.000  0.000 
Model Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors. 
 
2.5. Discussions and conclusions 
In this study, we investigate whether a board of directors plays a vital role in enhancing their 
corporate sustainability performance. To answer this research question, we explore the relationships 
between three main attributes of board structure and the different dimensions of corporate 
sustainability performance. While a linear function is applied to examine the influences of board 






quadratic terms of board size are considered in the regression. Our study is based on the triple bottom 
line approach of Elkington (1998) with the assumption that all three dimensions of sustainability, 
namely economic, environmental, and social, are equally important. The hypothesised relationships 
are supported by the combination of agency theory and stakeholder theory. The sample includes 
non-financial listed firms in the emerging East Asian economies from 2011-2016.  
The empirical results indicate no significant relationship between the three board attributes and the 
economic dimension of sustainability performance, that are contrary to our expectations. The 
possible reason for these findings emanates from the nature of the economic sustainability 
dimension. The first step for all businesses, even who are serious about environmental and social 
responsibility, is maintaining their own economic viability and financial health at least for survival. 
The economic dimension focuses on internal operational initiatives that directly contribute to the 
overall profitability of a firm to evaluate its survival capability and financial stability as perceived 
by management and shareholders (Labuschagne et al., 2005). Since economic performance is an 
essential prerequisite to place the trust of shareholders in a firm’s current and potential financial 
benefits, any corporate board that has small or large board size, low or high proportion of 
independent directors, and a combination or separation of CEO and board chair roles would address 
the economic dimension of sustainability performance.    
The findings provide evidence that the relationship between board size and environmental 
sustainability performance is inverse U-shaped. Accordingly, expanding the number of directors on 
board is likely to improve the environmental dimension of sustainability performance, but beyond 
a threshold, the influence of board size on environmental performance becomes negative. The 
findings imply that a firm with a large corporate board would have enough human resources to 
improve the effectiveness of their monitoring and advising tasks and would possess the richness and 
diversity of expertise required to exhibit high environmental performance. When board size 
becomes too large, even though all necessary resources are present, a board of directors would 
function ineffectively due to potential group dynamics problems. This trend is compatible with the 
characteristics of East Asian people who might work less effectively in very large groups. We 
suggest an ideal board size of approximately fifteen members for East Asian firms to achieve 






We empirically identify a linear and positive relationship between board size and the social 
dimension of sustainability performance. The findings imply that an increase in the number of board 
directors would enhance social performance. In fact, more directors in a corporate board would 
provide their firm with wider social networks that motivate them to understand, monitor, and deal 
with more issues related to the society. Judging from our findings, board directors in East Asian 
firms are more likely to be sensitive to corporate social activities than environmental ones, therefore 
be conscious of enhancing the social dimension of sustainability performance. This would be a 
possible explanation for a linear, rather than a non-linear, and positive impact of board size on social 
sustainability performance. 
Additionally, we find strong evidence that the proportion of independent directors on board 
positively influences both environmental and social sustainability performance. It appears that 
independent directors, with their power, independence, knowledge, expertise, and legal 
backgrounds, would give a board of directors new perspectives on corporate environmental and 
social responsibility and provide their firm with strong incentives to achieve high levels of 
environmental and social performance. We also expect that independent directors in East Asian 
firms would be ethical to promote the practice of ethical management in business corporations, thus 
tend to remain committed to environmental and social responsibility.   
Nevertheless, contrary to our expectations, the separation of CEO and board chair roles has no 
influence on the improvement of all sustainability dimensions, indicating that CEO duality is 
unlikely to be effective in the context of emerging East Asian economies. The findings can be 
explained by a strong and capable corporate board for monitoring even with the appointment of a 
CEO as a chairperson. It may be also noted that in East Asia, the separation of CEO and board chair 
roles may not mean much when these two roles are assigned to individuals in the same family or 
having close personal connections. This could be emanated from the cultural characteristics in East 
Asian firms where corporate governance systems are embedded in close relationships. Another 
possible explanation is that a chairperson in Asian listed firms is also a CEO normally when he or 
she is a substantial shareholder, thus CEO duality is not a serious matter. 
Our study makes some contributions to the existing literature. Concerning the literature on corporate 






independence in promoting sustainability performance, particularly the environmental and social 
dimensions, in the East Asian context. We achieve a more complete understanding of the 
relationship between board structure and sustainability performance by exploring the inverse U-
shaped impact of board size on the environmental dimension. Our empirical findings are consistent 
with agency theory and stakeholder theory.  
Our findings have shed the light on the role of corporate boards in enhancing corporate sustainability 
performance. We conclude that a good board of directors help a firm to achieve the goals of 
sustainable development. It is desirable to have superior board structure in order to effectively 
conduct the monitoring and advising tasks and foster corporate sustainability performance. The 
findings also indicate that in practice there is a sustained effort in East Asian firms to align the 
interest of corporate boards with sustainable development agenda through the different dimensions 
of sustainability performance.  
The findings of our study have practical implications for firms, stakeholders, and policy makers in 
emerging East Asian economies. First, firms that aim to pursue sustainable development strategies 
should consider human resources of their board of directors. The fact is that sustainable development 
might not be a viable strategy for all firms (Clarkson et al., 2011). A superior board structure can be 
a valuable tool to strengthen the corporate board and thus improve corporate sustainability 
performance. Second, shareholders can promote corporate sustainability performance by ensuring 
that their board of directors have suitable size and more independent directors. It is also necessary 
for other stakeholders to be aware of board structure when they evaluate corporate sustainability 
performance of a certain firm. Third, our findings are useful to regulators and policy makers by 
identifying the attributes of a corporate board that could become a further regulatory focus for listed 
firms to improve corporate governance practices and to implement sustainable development. 
There are some limitations in our study. First, the sample is representative but is restricted to listed 
East Asian firms that have conducted sustainability performance at least in the minimum level. 
Second, the basic premise of the triple bottom line performance is its voluntary nature so that our 
study keeps in view of the voluntary nature of sustainability initiatives. Third, we observe board 
structure in terms of board size, board independence, and board leadership structure but some other 
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Chapter 3  
The relationship between corporate sustainability performance 




















Financial reporting is an important part of the communication process between a firm and all its 
various stakeholders. Ideally, with financial accounting information, managers portray a true picture 
of their firm’s financial health to facilitate financial decision making of their external stakeholders 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). But in reality, managers tend to exercise their discretion to influence the 
communication process by intentionally managing their accounting results. Consequently, managers 
mislead outsiders over their financial reporting to pursue their short-term personal benefits instead 
of long-term interests of their various stakeholders. Serious allegations of accounting fraud at Enron, 
Tyco, WorldCom, or Merck at the beginning of the twenty-first century and the global financial 
crisis in 2008 are strong evidence of business moral decay. There is a pressing need for an ‘ethical 
bailout’ (Friedman, 2008) in developed economies like the United States and Europe, which spreads 
over emerging markets. The pressure on ethical communication comes from essential requirements 
of external capital providers, employees, customers, suppliers, communities, and regulators for 
financial transparency and accountability.  
After the global financial crisis, the term ‘sustainable development’ that is “adopting business 
strategies and activities that meet the needs of the enterprise and its stakeholders today while 
protecting, sustaining, and enhancing the human and natural resources that will be needed in the 
future” (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1992) has greatly influenced 
commitment strategies in the emerging markets (United Nations, 2013). Sustainable development 
is derived from ethical principles when sustainable firms integrate ethical value with all their 
decisions, actions, and policies to become good corporate citizens (Wheeler and Elkington, 2001). 
Accordingly, their behaviors and activities are expected to go far beyond legal compliance to be 
consistent with societal mores and ethical norms. The growing number of firms pursuing sustainable 
development strategies in the post financial crisis has raised a decisive question whether managers 
in sustainable firms provide their stakeholders with quality financial reporting. To answer our 
research question, we investigate the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and 
earnings management in the post financial crisis. Our contribution to the literature is the following. 
Sustainability is a multidimensional construct that encompasses a variety of corporate behavior in 






address the balance of three dimensions of sustainability, including economic, environmental, and 
social. The existing literature examines the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
constraining earnings management, that mostly focuses on environmental and social concerns. For 
instance, Kim et al. (2012) construct a CSR score based on KLD’s (now MSCI) five social rating 
categories including community relations, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
to investigate determinants of earnings management. Similarly, Bozzolan et al. (2015) and 
Martinez-Ferrero et al. (2016) use an aggregate CSR measure provided by EIRIS database with 
three constituents: community, employee, and environment. The literature covers important ground 
regarding sustainability but ignores the economic dimension of sustainability, leading to a lack of 
attention to the multidimensional nature of sustainability and its impact on earnings management.  
This study contributes to the existing literature on a thorough understanding of sustainability, 
including not only the environmental and social dimensions but also the economic concern, towards 
the relationship with earnings management. The economic dimension is related to not only “firm-
centric aspect of financial performance” but also “economic interests of external stakeholder, such 
as broad-based improvement in economic well-being and standards of living” (Sheth et al., 2011: 
24). This view is emanated from the 2008 global financial crisis with serious consequences for the 
community (e.g., prolonged collapse of asset market, widespread unemployment, steadily declining 
output, explosion of government debt) that bring deep and urgent attention to economic 
sustainability (Choi and Ng, 2011). Especially, in developing countries where the living standards 
are still much lower than in developed countries, the economic sustainability dimension is also 
extremely important to the whole community. Profitable firms not only bring long-term interests to 
their shareholders but also ensure stable employment for a large number of their employees over 
time. As a consequence, an improvement in economic well-being and standards of living is a good 
way to bring the happiness to the community.  
Previous studies mostly focus on developed economies (e.g., Kim et al., 2012 for the US), a single 
Asian market (e.g, Cho and Chun, 2016 for Korea; Muttakin et al., 2015 for Bangladesh), or take a 
very board multi-national view (e.g, Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008) to investigate the impact 
of CSR on earnings management. We focus our study on the emerging East Asian markets where 
their particular cultural and social values, wide geographical area, and relatively weak legal systems 






Asian economies are also characterized by high concentration of ownership and control by families 
that may increase information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders, thus affect financial 
reporting quality (Scholtens and Kang, 2013). We concern the period of 2012-2016 when emerging 
countries in East Asia have emphasized the importance of sustainable development in the new era, 
such as the Chinese government’s 12th five-year plan, the Korean national strategy for sustainable 
development, and the application of Taiwan green factory label system. 
We provide evidence that firms with better sustainability performance are less likely to engage in 
earnings management. In particular, sustainable firms tend to behave appropriately to avoid or 
reduce income-decreasing discretionary accruals. The findings are consistent with ethical concerns 
that drive managers to provide quality financial reports. Our study contributes to the literature by 
first demonstrating that corporate sustainability performance is a stimulus to enhance financial 
reporting quality and the improvement of all three sustainability dimensions is a useful tool to 
constrain earnings management. Our findings would be of interest to firms, investors, and policy 
makers by emphasizing the role of sustainability performance in constraining earnings management 
and the role of corporate ethics in providing transparent and reliable financial information. 
We review the literature and develop our hypothesis in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the 
research methodology. We present the results in Section 3.4. Finally, conclusions and discussions 
of our results are in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Literature review 
The most widely accepted definition of earnings management is offered by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999: 368), that is: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 






Healy and Wahlen (1999) refer to intentional practices of corporate managers to alter the accounting 
results for their opportunistic and/or information purposes. For instance, managers exercise some 
discretion over the accounting numbers, such as changes in estimated warranty liabilities, to 
understate or overstate their real earnings without violating generally accepted accounting 
principles. The basis of earnings management is established by agency theory (Davidson III et al., 
2004; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Prior et al., 2008). With conflict of interest and information 
asymmetries between management and shareholders, managers have spawned their opportunistic 
behavior to mislead shareholders and cause non-optimal decision making (Prior et al., 2008). In this 
context, the potential agency problem is identified and earnings management is an agency cost.  
The existing literature on the influence of CSR on earnings management provides the conceptual 
underpinnings for the influence of sustainability performance on earnings management. Namely, 
this literature affirms the theory of how CSR can positively or negatively impact on the level of 
earnings management. CSR is defined as “a company’s commitment to minimizing or eliminating 
any harmful effects and maximizing its long-run beneficial impact on society” (Mohr et al., 2001: 
47). Accordingly, some important areas of responsibility such as obeying laws and ethical norms, 
protecting the environment, treating employees fairly, and contributing to charities are specified as 
the dimensions of CSR. 
Prior studies on CSR have provided the theoretical background of placing firms’ ethical 
expectations into a rational economic and legal framework. Carroll (1979) proposes a social 
performance model addressing the entire range of firms’ obligations to society, including economic, 
legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities. His social performance categories suggest that 
social responsible firms should strive to make a profit, comply with legal requirements, embody 
ethical norms, and further be good corporate citizens by conducting voluntary activities. Jones 
(1995) develops instrumental stakeholder theory based on the  combination of economic theory and 
business ethics. He suggests that firms gain competitive advantages when they conduct business on 
the basis of ethical principles including trust, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness. Garriga and 
Melé (2004) classify the CSR theories as instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical theories 
according to four main aspects of CSR: an achievement of long-term profits, a responsible use of 
business power, the satisfaction of social demands, and ethical obligations to good society. Under 






likely to constrain earnings management, thus provide quality financial reporting to their 
stakeholders. 
A number of studies focus on ethical concerns as a motivation for CSR to prove the negative 
relationship between CSR and earnings management. For instance, Kim et al. (2012) construct a 
CSR score based on KLD’s (now MSCI) five social rating categories and confirm that US firms 
exhibiting CSR behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management. Their findings 
are in line with the notion that managers in socially responsible firms have a moral imperative to be 
honest, trustworthy, and ethical and thus adhere to high moral and ethical standards. More recently, 
Cho and Chun (2016) adopt stakeholder theory to explain the negative correlation between CSR 
activities and earnings manipulation in Korean firms. They argue that social responsible firms have 
a strong incentive to maintain good relationships with their diverse stakeholders, thus be unlikely to 
mislead their stakeholders over their firm value and financial performance.  
Alternatively, CSR initiatives are possibly related to the pursuit of managers’ self-interest from an 
agency cost perspective. McWilliams et al. (2006) suggest that CSR represents managers’ personal 
values and the motivation for CSR is driven by some kind of self-interest. Accordingly, managers 
might engage in CSR practice to secure their jobs, increase their compensation, gain their self-
promotion, or advance their careers. Furthermore, Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that 
firms adopt CSR to cover up the impact of corporate misdemeanor. Managers with their 
opportunistic incentives utilize CSR practices as a defensive tool to give stakeholders the first 
impression of firm transparency and then to distract careful scrutiny of stakeholders from managerial 
manipulation. This implies that firms follow CSR strategies as ‘a form of reputation insurance’ to 
receive a ‘license to operate’ in regard to earnings manipulation (Kim et al., 2012: 766). As a 
consequence, firms with highly rated CSR are more likely to attempt to mislead their stakeholders 
over their real financial performance. The positive relationship between CSR and earnings 
management has been confirmed by some empirical studies (e.g., Gargouri et al., 2010 for Canada; 
Muttakin et al., 2015 for Bangladesh; Prior et al., 2008 for 26 countries). 
In our general view, existing papers have focused on CSR as a determinant of earnings management, 
whereas multidimensional sustainability and especially its economic dimension have not been 






the correlation between corporate sustainability performance and earnings management. Hence we 
extend the literature by providing a complete understanding of corporate sustainability performance, 
including the economic, environmental, and social dimensions, towards the relationship with 
earnings management. 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis development 
While it is known that CSR influences earnings management, we contemplate whether corporate 
sustainability performance also influences earnings management. We reason that sustainability 
performance offers a negative impact on earnings management, as has been demonstrated with CSR 
initiatives in some prior studies (e.g, Cho and Chun, 2016; Kim et al., 2012). Thus, extending the 
arguments of Kim et al. (2012), we argue that sustainable development is emanated from an ethical 
perspective so sustainable firms tend to provide their investors with more transparent and reliable 
financial information.  
As stated by Székely and Knirsch (2005: 628), sustainability for businesses involves not only 
“sustaining and expanding economic growth, shareholder value, prestige, corporate reputation, 
customer relationships, and the quality of products and services” but also “adopting and pursuing 
ethical business practices, creating sustainable jobs, building value for all the company’s 
stakeholders and attending to the needs of the underserved”. They also suggest that sustainability 
means going beyond legal compliance rather than just complying with national regulations and 
international standards on the environment and society. This leads to a vision of sustainable firms 
where ethical obligation is of crucial importance above any other consideration to give attention to 
shareholders’ legitimate interests, to ethically behave towards all stakeholders, to satisfy the social 
norms and values, and to contribute to the good of society in an ethical way. This view is consistent 
with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984).  
Elkington (1998) strongly suggests sustainable firms for building trust as the most vital investment 
in social capital creation to employ the triple bottom line strategies in the development of the global 
sustainability agenda. He claims that the establishment of trust between an individual firm and its 






ideas when triple bottom line factors increasingly shape markets. Hence, if ethical business practices 
and social responsibility are believed to be important functions of management and corporate 
governance, enhancing transparency and reliability in how well a firm is doing would be a means 
to build the trust with employees, investors, customers, suppliers, and the local community. As a 
consequence, sustainable firms are likely to maintain the transparency and reliability in their 
financial information. 
Firms that incorporate the principles of sustainability into their business strategies need to overcome 
the crucial barriers to planning for their short- and long-term future (Székely and Knirsch, 2005). 
The adoption of sustainable development strategies requires a long time-frame, a wide perspective, 
a huge investment, and continuous assessment to embark on corporate sustainability performance 
and secure future business success. Nevertheless, consumer and market preferences are significantly 
influenced by product prices and product performance rather than a firm’s sustainability image 
(Hibiki and Managi, 2010). It is noted that price-sensitive consumers, who account for a majority in 
emerging East Asia, are unable or unwilling to pay a premium for products and services provided 
by sustainable firms (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). Furthermore, environmental and social 
performance is weakly mandated by legislation in most East Asian countries. Therefore, managers 
in East Asian firms who voluntarily expend their efforts and resources in implementing 
sustainability performance are considered to be ethical in business practices and are inclined to 
foster long-term relationships with their stakeholders, hence constrain earnings management. 
Taken together, if the underlying incentives in corporate sustainability performance are from the 
ethical perspective then sustainable firms are less likely to engage in earnings management. We 
propose the following hypothesis. 







3.3. Research design 
3.3.1. Data and sample selection 
We start with information on corporate sustainability performance from Asset4 ESG data of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. To date, Asset4 ESG has been extensively used in scholarly research 
(e.g., Braam and Peeters, 2018; Cheng et al., 2014; Drempetic et al., 2019; Eding and Scholtens, 
2017; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Mervelskemper and Streit, 2017). This is an international and 
diversified dataset that covers over 4,000 firms in the world and reports a wide range of data related 
to the firm’s actual ESG performance. The ESG ratings consist of over 600 individual data points 
that are aggregated into 214 key performance indicators and grouped within the following three 
pillars: economic, environmental, and social performance. Each performance score of a certain firm 
is calculated by equally weighting and z-scoring all its data points and comparing it against all other 
firms in DataStream. Therefore, the score is a relative measure in the range of zero to a hundred 
percent and a higher score is better.  
All data related to sustainability performance and financial information have been collected from 
DataStream. According to the classification of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI, 2016), 
the emerging East Asian countries include China, South Korea, and Taiwan. We obtain an initial 
sample of 350 firms (100 from China, 116 from South Korea, and 134 from Taiwan) that are 
available in DataStream from 2012-2016. The sampling firms account for approximately 40 percent 
of the total market capitalization in mainland China and also over 50 percent of the market 
capitalization of Shanghai Stock Exchange, represent nearly 70 percent of the total market 
capitalization in South Korea, and retain over 80 percent of Taiwan’s market capitalization in 2016. 
We exclude 65 financial firms from the sample because their earnings valuation and characteristics 
of accruals differ from non-financial firms, and thus obtain 1,425 firm-year observations from 2012 
to 2016. Another 169 firm-year observations are lost due to insufficient ESG data and insufficient 
financial information to calculate earnings management. We end up with a final unbalanced panel 







3.3.2. Variable measurement 
Dependent variable: Earnings management 
The large volume of literature on earnings management uses a measure of discretionary accruals as 
a surrogate for earnings management (e.g., Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2012; Prior et al., 2008). 
Discretionary accruals is defined as managerial actions that adjust the accruals part of earnings 
without inducing real economic consequences (Dechow et al., 1995). Changing the estimates of 
provisions such as warranties or customer refunds is a typical example of accrual-based earnings 
management. Since discretionary accruals does not undermine the fundamentals of long-term firm 
value, firms acknowledge the use of accounting accruals to produce smooth earnings (Graham et 
al., 2005). Hence we employ discretionary accruals as our proxy for earnings management.  
We use the modified Jones model suggested by Dechow et al. (1995) to measure discretionary 
accruals (see Appendix 3.1 for detail). In the model, non-discretionary accruals reflects normal 
business activities and is not easy for managers to manipulate, whereas discretionary accruals calls 
managerial intervention to financial reporting as a way of earnings management (Sun et al., 2010). 
Discretionary accruals is obtained by subtracting non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. 
Jones (1991) proposes a model to control for the effect of changes in a firm’s economic 
circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals, including the change in revenues that represents the 
change in working capital accounts and the level of property, plant, and equipment that controls for 
nondiscretionary depreciation expense. In the modified Jones model, Dechow et al. (1995) assume 
that not all revenues are necessarily nondiscretionary, and the change in credit sales, represented by 
the change in receivables, in the event period result from earnings management. They claim that the 
modified Jones model becomes more powerful than the Jones model in detecting earnings 
management when discretion is exercised over credit sales. Until now, it has been a commonly 
applied method in the literature (e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013; Muttakin et al., 2015).  
Discretionary accruals can be exercised to overstate firms’ true earnings and understate their 
unfavorable earnings. Since strategic accounting choices include both income-increasing and 
income-decreasing choices, we use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) as a 






We also use a signed value of discretionary accruals, namely positive (Pos_DA) and negative 
(Neg_DA), to represent income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management, 
respectively. Higher ABS_DA means more extensive earnings management. For the signed value, 
the higher (or lower) Pos_DA (or Neg_DA) is, the greater earnings management is. 
Independent variable: Corporate sustainability performance 
The metrics for corporate sustainability performance need to be approved to assess a firm’s process 
towards promoting sustainable development internally and externally in any given time period 
(Székely and Knirsch, 2005). Proponents (e.g., Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; Galbreath, 2018; 
Hussain et al., 2018) suggest that all necessary means for firms to pursue sustainable development 
are demonstrating their outstanding outcomes in economic development, environmental protection, 
and social responsibility. Accordingly, sustainability performance of a firm should be measured by 
assessing three sustainability dimensions, namely economic, environmental, and social 
performance. Krajnc and Glavič (2005) propose a mathematical model to determine the composite 
sustainability index that depicts firm performance along three sustainability dimensions. In 
particular, after determining the sub-indices of economic, environmental, and social performance 
from a set of sustainability indicators, the sub-indices are combined into the composite sustainability 
index which takes into account the weights of importance of the three performance.  
In our study, to construct the measurement of corporate sustainability performance, we utilize the 
scores of economic, environmental, and social performance at a firm-year level that are provided by 
DataStream. In particular, economic performance reflects a firm’s overall financial health and 
measures its capacity to generate a high return on investment, sustainable growth, and long-term 
shareholder value by using all its resources and management practices efficiently. Next, 
environmental performance measures a firm’s impact on complete ecosystems and natural systems 
and reflects its capacity to generate shareholder value by capitalizing on environmental 
opportunities and avoiding environmental risks. Moreover, social performance measures a firm’s 
capacity to generate loyalty and trust with its employees, customers, suppliers, and society and 
reflects its reputation and the health of its license to operate in order to generate shareholder value 






As discussed above, sustainable development requires the balance and the integration of economic 
growth, environmental protection, and social responsibility. Thus the importance of the three 
dimensions of sustainability performance should be equally considered, that is consistent with the 
triple bottom line approach. We also notice that the number of key performance indicators across 
the three performance in the ESG data are approximately equal, that implies their equal importance. 
Therefore, by applying the model of Krajnc and Glavič (2005), we measure corporate sustainability 
performance as an equally weighted average of scores of economic, environmental, and social 
performance at the firm-year level. A higher average score gives better sustainability performance. 
As a continuous variable on a large scale from zero to a hundred percent, corporate sustainability 
performance is easily comparable among different firms. However, in some cases, important 
differences among economic, environmental, and social performance of a particular firm can be 
cloaked. For instance, with the same score of economic performance, a firm with medium scores in 
both environmental and social performance is surely different from a firm with a high score of 
environmental performance and a low score of social performance. A distinction may be lost in an 
equally weighted average. Thus, we use an alternative measure of corporate sustainability 
performance in the robustness check to confirm our measurement and main findings.  
Control variables 
Real earnings manipulation is defined as managerial actions that modify a firm’s performance and 
operations with inducing real economic consequences (Roychowdhury, 2006). It is probable that 
firms engage in less discretionary accruals to engage in more real activities manipulation, rather 
than to reduce earnings management (Kim et al., 2012). Hence, we control for the substitutive nature 
of these two earnings management methods by including real activities manipulation, which is 
estimated by the model of Roychowdhury (2006), in the regression (see Appendix 3.2 for detail). 
The extent of earnings management might differ between larger and smaller firms. Managers in 
larger firms are under pressure to increase market share prices, thus spurs them to manipulate their 
earnings (Richardson et al., 2002). However, closer scrutiny of outsiders and stricter requirements 
of transparency in larger firms result in lower earnings management (Lee and Choi, 2002). Thus we 






We consider market to book ratio to potentially explain the variation of earnings management. 
According to Chih et al. (2008), an increase in stock prices puts pressure on management to keep 
trading in substantial multiples of their book value. These firms have more incentive to manipulate 
reported earnings to avoid breaking the string of consecutive earnings increases. Hence we expect 
the positive relation between market to book ratio and earnings management. 
The relation between firm leverage and earnings management is controversial. Richardson et al. 
(2002) argue that firms with higher leverage tend to strategically manipulate their earnings to 
respond to debt covenants. However, Dechow and Skinner (2000) find out the negative correlation 
between firm leverage and earnings management. We control for leverage, measured by total debts 
to total assets, to capture the impact of firm leverage on earnings management. 
The extent of earnings management in profitable and unprofitable firms could be different. It is 
suggested that low-income firms have more incentives to manage their reporting earnings because 
they aim to convey an impression on their stakeholders (Cho and Chun, 2016). We use return on 
assets to control for the potential effect of financial performance.  
We control for firm growth that is calculated as the change in total sales divided by total sales of the 
previous year. High-growth firms have greater incentives to beat earnings targets than low-growth 
firms (Bozzolan et al., 2012). Hence we expect the positive relation between firm growth and 
earnings management. 
Kim et al. (2012) find out the positive association between research and development (R&D) 
intensity and earnings management. The finding indicates that firms investing in R&D activities are 
more likely to engage in earnings management. Therefore, we include R&D intensity in the 
discretionary accruals regression.   
Ownership concentration of insiders can have an influence on financial reporting quality (Alsaadi 
et al., 2017). We use the percentage of stock shares owned by insiders to measure their ownership 
concentration that would express the incentive of insiders to engage in discretionary behavior and 
earnings management. 






Table 3.1 Measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
Variable Definition Measurement/ Source 
Dependent variables 
DA Discretionary accruals Appendix 3.1 
ABS_DA Absolute value of discretionary accruals Appendix 3.1 
Pos_DA Positive value of discretionary accruals Appendix 3.1 
Neg_DA Negative value of discretionary accruals Appendix 3.1 
Independent variable 
CSP Corporate sustainability performance DataStream 
Control variables 
RAM  Real activities manipulation Appendix 3.2 
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of net sales 
MTB Market to book ratio Market value to book value of equity 
LEV Firm leverage Total debts to total assets 
ROA Firm performance Return on assets 
GROW Firm growth Percentage change in net sales 
R&D R&D intensity R&D expense to net sales 
CLOSE Ownership concentration Percentage of closely held shares 
 
3.3.3. Empirical model 
We begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification to investigate the relationship between 
corporate sustainability performance and earnings management. Note that each firm works in a 
particular industry and occupies a particular country which has its own accounting standards and 
legality of environmental and social practices (Reinhardt et al., 2008). Hence, we use dummy 
variables to control for industry effects (according to the Industry Classification Benchmark) and 
country effects (including China, Taiwan, and South Korea). In addition, time-dependent 
macroeconomic factors such as government policy or systemic shocks could influence firm 
performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). Therefore, we include yearly dummy variables to control 






into firms and report test statistics and significance levels based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level, which are robust to heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, as recommended 
by Petersen (2009). 
A potential specification problem is that corporate sustainability performance could be a function 
of earnings management, which leads to an uncertainty of the direction of causality. Thus we use 
one-year lagged corporate sustainability performance as an independent variable in the regression 
model to adjust for the phenomenon. In addition, we use a one-year time lag of the four financial 
performance variables, including firm size, market to book ratio, firm leverage, and firm 
performance, to control for possible simultaneity and avoid an endogeneity problem. It can be 
explained that earning management is also a determinant of these financial characteristics since 
managers manipulate their reported earnings to alter financial information. 
Consequently, we rely on the following model to capture the relationship between corporate 
sustainability performance and accrual-based earnings management. 
ABS_DAit (or DAit) = β0 + β1 * CSPit-1 + β2 * RAMit + β3 * SIZEit-1 + β4 * MTBit-1 + β5 * LEVit-1 
+ β6 * ROAit-1 + β7 * GROWit + β8 * R&Dit  + β9 * CLOSEit  + 
Country_Controls + Industry_Controls + Year_Controls + Ɛit (1) 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 presents the sample distribution by year and country (Panel A) and by industry and country 
(Panel B). The distribution of our sample across countries is reasonable: 26.0 percent of the sample 
are in China, 32.7 percent are in South Korea, and 41.3 percent are in Taiwan. The number of firms 
in the sample has increased from 2012 to 2016 as a positive sign for an effort to pursue sustainable 
development in East Asia. According to the Industry Classification Benchmark, the most heavily 
represented industries are Industrials (27.9 percent) and Technology (24.6 percent), followed by 






Table 3.2 Sample distribution 
Panel A. Distribution of firm-year observations by year and country 
 
 Country  Total 
Year  China S. Korea Taiwan  Observations In percent 
2012  62 75 98  235 18.7 
2013  64 79 102  245 19.5 
2014  64 82 104  250 19.9 
2015  66 85 106  257 20.5 
2016  70 90 109  269 21.4 
Total  326 411 519  1,256 100.0 
Panel B. Distribution of firm-year observations by industry and country 
 
 Country  Total 
Industry  China S. Korea Taiwan  Observations In percent 
Technology  0 51 258   309 24.6 
Telecommunications  15 15 22   52 4.1 
Health care  15 11 0   26 2.1 
Consumer Discretionary  47 98 56   201 16.0 
Consumer Staples  10 22 14   46 3.7 
Industrials  127 144 79   350 27.9 
Basic Materials  50 45 80   175 13.9 
Energy  46 15 10   71 5.7 
Utilities  16 10 0   26 2.1 
Total  326 411 519   1,256 100.0 
 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables for 
the sample. All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentile to control for the 
outlier effect. Meanwhile, the sustainability performance score is z-scored in the ESG ratings and 







Table 3.3  Descriptive statistics  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of all variables  
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables 
DA 1,256 0.002 0.045 -0.144 0.136 
ABSDA 1,256 0.033 0.031 0.000 0.144 
Pos_DA 624 0.035 0.032 0.000 0.136 
Neg_DA 632 -0.031 0.030 -0.144 0.000 
Independent variable 
CSP 1,256 0.435 0.293 0.053 0.961 
Control variables 
RAM 1,256 0.001 0.160 -0.674 0.413 
SIZE 1,256 15.283 1.436 11.774 18.963 
MTB 1,256 2.040 1.653 0.360 9.600 
LEV 1,256 0.256 0.168 0.000 0.679 
ROA 1,256 0.054 0.063 -0.132 0.260 
GROW 1,256 0.067 0.223 -0.494 1.185 
R&D 1,256 0.022 0.037 0.000 0.205 
CLOSE 1,256 0.374 0.215 0.000 0.999 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of the sustainability performance score 
Year Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
2012 235 0.423 0.286 0.067 0.961 
2013 245 0.403 0.284 0.061 0.958 
2014 250 0.441 0.307 0.053 0.958 
2015 257 0.448 0.297 0.054 0.956 
2016 269 0.458 0.290 0.056 0.958 
 
The mean of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) is 3.30 percent of lagged total 
assets, which is comparable to the value reported by Gong and Ho (2018) for China or Choi et al. 






(DA) is positive, suggesting that firms in the emerging East Asian economies tend to engage in more 
income-increasing than income-decreasing earnings management. Discretionary accruals has its 
standard deviation of approximately 3.0 percent in the sample. 
For the independent variable, the corporate sustainability performance score has the mean of 43.5 
percent indicating that the East Asian firms generally promote sustainability performance. The score 
exhibits a relatively high variance among the firms, as shown by its standard deviation of 29.3 
percent and its range of from 5.3 to 96.1 percent, suggesting different sustainability initiatives 
between firms in the post global financial crisis. There is also an upward trend in the sustainability 
performance mean score from 42.3 percent in 2012 to 45.8 percent in 2016. This trend indicates that 
a commitment to sustainable development of the East Asian firms is resilient over time.   
For the control variables, the mean of real activities manipulation is positive and equals 0.1 percent 
of lagged total assets, which is comparable to the value reported by Bozzolan et al. (2015). The 
mean of firm size equals 15.28 (equivalent to net sales of 11.7 billion US dollars), ranging from 
11.77 (130 thousand US dollars) to 18.96 (172 billion US dollars). Market to book ratio is 2.04 on 
average with the standard deviation of 1.65. The ratio of total debts to total assets is 25.6 percent on 
average and ranges from 0 to 67.9 percent. Return on assets equals 5.4 percent on average with the 
standard deviation of 0.06. The mean value of sales growth is positive at 6.7 percent. R&D intensity 
is 2.2 percent on average and ranges from 0 to 20.5 percent. The percentage of shares held by 
insiders is averagely 37.4 percent in the sample. 
Table 3.4 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix between variables. As shown, corporate 
sustainability performance is negatively correlated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ρ = -0.077). This is a first indication that firms with better sustainability performance might lower 
earnings management. Next, we examine whether there are multicollinearity problems between the 
independent variable and control variables by using matrix correlation and running the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The unconditional correlations are generally moderate in magnitude. In 
addition, no independent variable and control variables have VIF greater than 10, which is the 
generally accepted range for individual variables (Kennedy, 1998). We therefore conclude that there 




Table 3.4 Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables 
 VIF ABSDAt CSPt-1 RAMt SIZEt-1 MTBt-1 LEVt-1 ROAt-1 GROWt R&Dt CLOSEt 
ABSDAt  1           
CSPt-1 1.29 -0.077*** 1          
RAMt 1.18 0.016 -0.094*** 1         
SIZEt-1 1.48 -0.036 0.424*** 0.001 1        
MTBt-1 1.49 0.030 -0.110*** -0.200*** -0.281*** 1       
LEVt-1 1.39 -0.032 0.006 0.164*** 0.217*** -0.182*** 1      
ROAt-1 1.88 -0.012 -0.038 -0.342*** -0.189*** 0.526*** -0.472*** 1    
GROWt 1.05 0.051* -0.045 -0.107*** -0.093*** 0.155*** -0.100*** 0.180*** 1     
R&Dt 1.19 0.017 0.026 -0.148*** -0.260*** 0.063** -0.211*** 0.070** -0.010 1   
CLOSEt 1.08 -0.075*** -0.120*** 0.067** 0.081*** 0.016 0.152*** -0.062** 0.019 -0.211*** 1 




3.4.2. Regression results 
Table 3.5 reports the regression results of the correlation between corporate sustainability 
performance and discretionary accruals. As shown, the estimated coefficient for CSP in the 
ABS_DA regression is negative (β=-0.011) at the 5% significance level. This result indicates that 
firms with better corporate sustainability performance are less likely to manage their earnings 
through discretionary accruals. The result supports our hypothesis. 
Table 3.5 Regression results of corporate sustainability performance and discretionary accruals 
 ABSDAt  Pos_DAt  Neg_DAt 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
CSPt-1 -0.011** -2.10  -0.005 -0.71  0.018*** 2.78 
RAMt 0.003 0.25  0.033*** 3.23  0.036** 2.38 
SIZEt-1 0.001 0.47  0.001 0.72  0.000 -0.20 
MTBt-1 0.002** 2.46  0.002** 2.16  -0.001 -1.11 
LEVt-1 -0.009 -1.21  -0.021** -2.11  -0.001 -0.10 
ROAt-1 -0.029 -1.22  0.014 0.43  0.090*** 2.72 
GROWt 0.007 1.40  0.004 0.75  -0.011 -1.33 
R&Dt -0.032 -0.93  -0.074 -1.35  0.002 0.04 
CLOSEt -0.008 -1.36  -0.014* -1.92  0.001 0.09 
Constant 0.039** 2.21  0.035* 1.75  -0.038 -1.55 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
F value 9.90***  7.67***  5.54*** 
Prob>F 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Adj. R2 8.79  13.29  13.06 
Observations 1,256  624  632 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on the robust standard errors adjusted 






To gain further insight into whether the effect of CSP on ABS_DA is driven by either Pos_DA or 
Neg_DA, we run separate regressions for sub-samples according to a signed value of DA. A positive 
and significant relation between CSP and Neg_DA (β=0.018 at p=0.00) indicates that firms with 
better corporate sustainability performance engage in less income-decreasing earnings management 
through accruals. In the Pos_DA regression, the coefficient for CSP is negative but insignificant, 
implying that there is no impact of corporate sustainability performance on income-increasing 
earnings management.  
In terms of control variables, ABS_DA is not significantly associated with RAM that implies no 
trade-off between accrual-based and real operating-based earnings management. However, it is 
noted that coefficients for RAM in the Pos_DA and Neg_DA regressions are positive (β=0.033 and 
β=0.036 respectively) and significant (p=0.00 and p=0.01 respectively). Accordingly, firms conduct 
both discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation as earnings management tools to 
increase their earnings. When firms manipulate to decrease their earnings, discretionary accruals 
instead of real activities manipulation has been applied.  
In the ABS_DA regression, the coefficient for MTB is positive and significant (β=0.002 at p=0.01). 
The result indicates that firms with higher market to book ratio are more likely to engage in 
discretionary accruals. It can be explained that firms with higher market to book ratio have more 
incentive to manipulate reported earnings to avoid breaking the string of consecutive earnings 
increases. For the other control variables in the ABS_DA regression, we could not find any 
significant relationships with accrual-based earnings management. 
 
3.4.3. Robustness check 
An alternative measure of corporate sustainability performance 
As discussed above, we propose an alternative measure of corporate sustainability performance to 
confirm our findings. In particular, for every firm-year observation, we transform a score of its each 
performance, including economic, environmental, and social performance, into a binary value. It 
takes a value of one if the performance score is above the sample country-year average score of the 






performance of each firm-year observation. We obtain the ordinal value of corporate sustainability 
performance, that varies from zero for the worst sustainability performance to three for the best 
sustainability performance.  
Table 3.6 Regression results of the alternative measure of corporate sustainability performance and 
discretionary accruals  
 ABSDAt  Pos_DAt  Neg_DAt 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
CSP_Ordert-1 -0.002** -2.11  -0.001 -0.61  0.004*** 2.90 
RAMt 0.003 0.27  0.033*** 3.23  0.036** 2.32 
SIZEt-1 0.000 0.39  0.001 0.67  0.000 -0.15 
MTBt-1 0.002** 2.42  0.002** 2.15  -0.001 -1.06 
LEVt-1 -0.009 -1.17  -0.021** -2.09  -0.001 -0.13 
ROAt-1 -0.029 -1.22  0.014 0.43  0.091*** 2.75 
GROWt 0.007 1.36  0.004 0.71  -0.011 -1.36 
R&Dt -0.033 -0.96  -0.075 -1.38  0.002 0.05 
CLOSEt -0.008 -1.35  -0.014* -1.92  0.001 0.08 
Constant 0.039** 2.27  0.036* 1.82  -0.039 -1.55 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
F value 10.08***  7.62***  5.68*** 
Prob>F 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Adj. R2 8.77  13.25  13.32 
Observations 1,256  624  632 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on the robust standard errors adjusted 
by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
We run the multiple regression of discretionary accruals on the alternative measure of corporate 






those reported in Table 3.5. We confirm that the measurement of corporate sustainability 
performance is appropriate and our findings are robust. 
An analysis of each dimension of corporate sustainability performance  
We examine the impact of each dimension of corporate sustainability performance, namely 
economic, environmental, and social performance, on discretionary accruals. We replace CSP with 
each performance (CSP1 for economic performance, CSP2 for environmental performance, and 
CSP3 for social performance) in Model 1 and rerun the stepwise multiple regression. All the results 
are presented in Table 3.7. CSP1, CSP2, and CSP3 are negatively and significantly associated with 
ABS_DA that indicates the importance of all three performance to constrain earnings management. 
Table 3.7 Regression results of each corporate sustainability performance and discretionary accruals 
 ABSDAt  ABSDAt  ABSDAt 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
CSP1(t-1) -0.009** -1.98       
CSP2(t-1)    -0.009** -1.98    
CSP3(t-1)       -0.009* -1.95 
Control Variables Included  Included  Included 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
F value 10.02***  9.61***  9.59*** 
Prob>F 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Adj. R2 8.58  8.69  8.70 
Observations 1,256  1,256  1,256 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on the robust standard errors adjusted 







Table 3.8 2SLS regression results for the endogeneity problem 
 1st stage  2
nd stage 
 Coefficient t- statistic  Coefficient t- statistic 
CSPt-1    -0.026** -2.27 
Mean CSPt-1 -1.425*** -7.77    
RAMt -0.136 -1.44  0.000 0.03 
SIZEt-1 0.066*** 6.57  0.002 1.22 
MTBt-1 -0.003 -0.45  0.002** 2.43 
LEVt-1 -0.038 -0.48  -0.010 -1.34 
ROAt-1 0.203 1.03  -0.029 -1.21 
GROWt 0.020 0.66  0.008 1.50 
R&Dt -0.045 -0.13  -0.030 -0.88 
CLOSEt -0.023 -0.46  -0.009 -1.46 
Constant -0.169 -0.86  0.026 1.28 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value/ Wald chi2(23) 24.45***  195.34*** 
Prob>F 0.00  0.00 
Adj. R2 47.44  7.61 
Observations 1,256  1,256 
F-statistic 60.33***  - 
Prob > F 0.00  - 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on the standard errors adjusted by a 
one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
We assume that corporate sustainability performance is an exogenous variable in the model, 
however the possibility of the endogenous relationship between sustainability performance and 
earnings management should be considered. To address the potential endogeneity issue, we employ 






that CSP is endogenous. Following Bozzolan et al. (2015), we use the mean of CSP in year t of all 
firms belonging to firm i’s industry-country group but excluding firm i as an instrument for CSP of 
firm i in year t. This instrumental variable tends to be correlated with the endogenous variable but 
has no association with the dependent variable.  
We perform the Wald test of Stock and Yogo (2005) to test the null hypothesis of a weak instrument. 
As shown in Table 3.8, an F-statistic for the joint significance of the instrument in the first-stage 
regression equals 60.33 that exceeds the critical value, therefore we reject the null hypothesis of a 
weak instrument. 
With the instrumental variable, we perform 2SLS regression analysis to control for the endogeneity 
issue. The results remain qualitatively similar in Table 3.8 and, therefore, appear to be robust to the 
estimation method. We conclude that firms with better corporate sustainability performance would 
constrain earnings management. 
 
3.5. Conclusions and discussions 
In this study, we examine whether sustainable firms provide quality financial reporting for their 
stakeholders. To answer this research question, we explore the relationship between corporate 
sustainability performance and earnings management. If corporate sustainability performance is 
emanated from an ethical perspective, then we predict that sustainable firms tend to provide their 
stakeholders with more transparent and reliable financial information. 
We base our study on the triple bottom line of Elkington (1998). Accordingly, we propose the 
measurement of corporate sustainability performance that focuses on the balance of economic, 
environmental, and social performance. In terms of earnings management, we rely on the modified 
Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) to measure discretionary accruals. We also control for real 
activities manipulation, firm size, market to book ratio, firm leverage, firm performance, firm 
growth, R&D intensity, and ownership concentration. The sample includes non-financial listed 
firms in the emerging East Asian economies from 2012-2016. All data are collected from Asset4 






Our empirical results support the premise that firms with better corporate sustainability performance 
are less likely to engage in discretionary accruals. The findings are consistent with the ethical 
perspective which emphasizes the ethical obligations of management to their various stakeholders, 
especially when they follow sustainable development strategies. We conclude that sustainable firms 
in the emerging East Asian economies provide their stakeholders with quality financial reporting. A 
plausible explanation is that sustainable development has been a relatively new concept in recent 
years and has been acted on voluntary corporate initiatives in the East Asian region, leading to ‘real’ 
corporate sustainability performance aligned with the ethical principle.  
Additionally, we provide strong evidence that firms with better sustainability performance tend to 
constrain income-decreasing earnings management through accruals. The finding implies that 
managers in East Asian firms would engage in less corporate tax avoidance and less dividend 
omissions or reductions when they promote sustainable development strategies. However, we 
observe no significant impact of corporate sustainability performance on income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. Such earnings management could be motivated by an attempt to minimize 
or delay reporting bad news instead of to signal future performance, but has not been influenced by 
sustainable development initiatives. Our findings are understandable when income-increasing 
discretionary accruals is preferable in East Asian firms, so it is more difficult for the management 
to give up income-increasing than income-decreasing earnings management. 
This study contributes to the literature by emphasizing the role of corporate sustainability 
performance in constraining earnings management and the role of corporate ethics in providing 
transparent and reliable financial reporting. We focus on the multidimensional nature of corporate 
sustainability performance with a necessity of achieving economic, environmental, and social 
corporate objectives simultaneously and shed light on how corporate sustainability performance 
constrains earnings management. We also put an ethical perspective on sustainable firms where 
ethical obligation is of crucial importance above their any other consideration to provide 
stakeholders with quality financial reporting. 
Our findings would be of interest to firms, stakeholders, and policy makers in East Asia. First, firms 
are encouraged to follow sustainable development strategies and achieve the outstanding outcomes 






of the investing community in their financial reporting quality. Second, information related to 
corporate sustainability performance would provide stakeholders with possible implications of 
firms’ financial reporting practices. Since corporate sustainability performance influences 
discretionary decisions of managers, stakeholders can differentiate sustainable firms with quality 
financial reporting from the others. Stakeholders should also be aware of the possibility of income-
increasing earnings management in all firms whether they are sustainable or not. Third, the study is 
useful to regulators and policy makers for understanding firms’ business practices and assessing 
firms’ reporting behaviors in light of sustainable development. They can identify the important 
aspects of sustainability performance that could become further regulatory focus to improve 
financial reporting quality.  
There are some limitations in our study. The sample is representative but is restricted to listed East 
Asian firms that have conducted sustainability performance at least in the minimum level. In 
addition, the basic premise of the triple bottom line performance is its voluntary nature, so we 
consider corporate sustainability performance in East Asia as voluntary compliance rather than 
mandatory requirements. The study pays no attention to moderating effects, such as corporate 
governance, on the relationship between sustainability performance and earnings management. We 
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Appendix 3.1. Measurement of discretionary accruals of Dechow et al. (1995) 
Jones (1991) defines total accruals as the difference between net income and cash flow from 
operations. Total accruals is divided into the discretionary and nondiscretionary components. 
According to the Jones model, nondiscretionary accruals is estimated by a function of the change in 
revenues and the level of property, plant, and equipment. The portion of total accruals unexplained 
by normal operating activities is discretionary accruals. 
The industry classification is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark. We group the sample 
according to country, industry, and year. The group with the number of observations fewer than six 
is excluded from the sample (Park and Shin, 2004). For each group, we apply the standard Jones 
model (1991) by regressing total accruals on the change in revenues and the level of property, plant 
and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets to avoid heteroscedasticity, as follows: 
TAit/Ait-1 = α0 (1/Ait-1) + α1 (REVit /Ait-1) + α2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + Ɛit 
Dechow et al. (1995) suggest the modified Jones model that the change in revenues is adjusted for 
the change in receivables with the assumption of the change in credit sales resulting from earnings 
management. Therefore, from the estimated coefficients above (α0, α1, α2), we estimate firm i’s 
discretionary accruals as the residuals Ɛit from the annual cross-sectional regression model:  
Ɛit = TAit/Ait-1 – [α0 (1/Ait-1) + α1 (REVit - RECit /Ait-1) + α2 (PPEit/Ait-1)] 
Where: 
- TAit = total accruals for firm i in year t 
- REVit = change in net revenues for firm i in year t from year t-1 
- RECit = change in net receivables for firm i in year t from year t-1 
- PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t 







Appendix 3.2. Measurement of real activities manipulation of Roychowdhury (2006) 
The industry classification is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark. We group the sample 
according to country, industry, and year. The group with the number of observations fewer than six 
is excluded from the sample. For each group, we apply the model of Roychowdhury (2006) to 
measure abnormal levels of three real activities manipulation. 
(1) Abnormal operating cash flows (AB_CFO) 
The model to estimate the normal level of operating cash flows: 
CFOit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(Sit/Ait-1) + β2(Sit/Ait-1) + Ɛit 
Where: 
- CFOit = cash flows from operations for firm i in year t 
- Ait-1 = total assets for firm i in year t-1 
- Sit = net revenues for firm i in year t from year t-1 
- Sit = change in net revenues for firm i in year t from year t-1 
For every firm-year observation, abnormal cash flows from operations (AB_CFO) is the residual Ɛt  
(2) Abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) 
The model to estimate the normal level of cost of goods sold: 
COGSit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(Sit/Ait-1) + Ɛit  
Where: COGSit = cost of goods sold for firm i in year t 
The model to estimate the normal level of inventory growth: 
INVit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(Sit/Ait-1) + β2(Sit-1/Ait-1) + Ɛit  






Production costs: PRODit = COGSit + INVit 
We have the model to estimate the normal level of production costs: 
PRODit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(Sit/Ait-1) + β2(Sit/Ait-1) + β3(Sit-1/Ait-1) + Ɛit 
For every firm-year observation, abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) is the residual Ɛt. 
(3) Abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_EXP) 
The model to estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses: 
DISEXPit/Ait-1 = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1) + β1(Sit-1/Ait-1) + Ɛit  
Where: DISEXPit = discretionary expenses for firm i in year t, defined as the sum of R&D, 
advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses 
For every firm-year observation, abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_EXP) is the residual Ɛt. 
(4) A combined measure of real activities manipulation (RAM) 
Following Cohen et al. (2008), we construct the combined measures of real activities manipulation 
by aggregating the three individual real activities manipulation proxies, AB_CFO, AB_PROD, and 
AB_EXP after considering the direction of each real activities manipulation component: 











The relationship between corporate environmental performance 
and corporate financial performance: evidence from the emerging 





































Does it pay to be green? This has been a controversial question for over forty years and until now 
there is still no generally accepted theoretical framework to explain contradictory results in the 
literature. While Friedman (1970) first states the only one social responsibility of business being to 
increase its profits, Porter and van der Linde (1995) encourage firms in environmental activities to 
enhance their financial performance, known as the ‘Porter hypothesis’. In view of that, many 
previous studies have used a linear function to focus on the sign (negative or positive) of the relation 
between environmental and financial performance (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; 
Hussain et al., 2018; Wagner et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2014). However, the linear relationships do 
not always fit all cases. This is because environmental responsibility always requires additional 
investments but generates economic profits to some extent, suggesting the existence of non-linear 
relations (U-shape or inverted U-shape) in some prior research (e.g., Fujii et al.,2013; Misani and 
Pogutz, 2015; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Yu et al., 2018). In this study, we reconcile these 
divergent views through empirical research on the relationship between environmental performance 
and financial performance by using both linear and quadratic functions.  
Empirical studies on non-linear relationships between environmental and financial performance 
focus on developed economies (e.g., Fujii et al., 2013 for Japan; Wagner and Blom, 2011 for 
Germany and UK) or take a very board international view (e.g., Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Trumpp 
and Guenther, 2017; Yu et al., 2018). However, no related study has been conducted in the emerging 
East Asian markets to date. After the 2008 global financial crisis, fiscal stimulus packages have 
been triggered to get economies back on the growth path (Sonnenschein and Mundaca, 2016). 
Taking advantage of cheap labour and low material costs, the majority of Western manufacturers 
have relocated their manufacturing bases and production facilities to East Asia (Lai and Wong, 
2012). The rapid industrialization pushes the East Asian economic growth, but by contrast, puts 
enormous pressure on the environment and natural resources. For instance, China, South Korea, and 
Taiwan are the world’s current largest emitters of carbon dioxide in 2014 (International Energy 
Agency, 2015). Meanwhile, these countries have been focusing on sustainable development, such 
as the Chinese government’s 12th five-year plan in 2011, the Korean national strategy for sustainable 






Accordingly, a study on the relation between environmental performance and financial performance 
in the emerging East Asian economies in the post financial crisis is pressing. 
While environmental performance is a multidimensional construct that encompasses a variety of 
corporate environmental behaviour, the existing literature has neglected its multifaceted nature thus 
far. In the general view, environmental performance consists of two interrelated dimensions, namely 
environmental management performance that focuses on management activities with regard to 
environmental aspects and environmental operational performance that focuses on outcomes of 
these activities and processes (Trumpp et al., 2015). However, the previous empirical studies mostly 
focus on specific environmental outcomes such as CO2 emissions and the toxic risk (Fujii et al., 
2013), carbon performance and waste intensity (Trumpp and Guenther, 2017), and greenhouse gas 
emissions (Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Wang et al., 2014) to explore the non-linear relationship 
between environmental and financial performance. A multidimensional nature of environmental 
performance has been ignored, thus makes a great difference between the conceptualization of 
environmental performance and its measurement in empirical research. This study would contribute 
to the existing literature by considering a multidimensional aggregate construct of environmental 
performance and its impact on financial performance. 
We use both accounting-based and market-based measurement to capture two different aspects of 
financial performance. While accounting profitability measures corporate efficiency and 
organizational capabilities, market value reflects reputational effects arising from multi-stakeholder 
involvement and investors’ expectations of future profitability (Trumpp and Guenther, 2017). 
Adopting both measures of financial performance helps us to investigate the impact of 
environmental performance on short-term/current profitability and long-term/potential profitability. 
This assessment mitigates some inevitable deficiencies in including one measure but excluding the 
other and also serves robustness purposes (Nollet et al., 2016). Consistent with a large number of 
related empirical studies, we use return on assets to capture a firm's efficiency in utilizing its assets 
and select Tobin's Q ratio to look at whether further investments should be made. 
We find empirical evidence of a non-linear relationship between environmental performance and 
financial performance. More precisely, environmental performance has a U-shaped impact on both 






in corporate environmental performance deteriorates financial performance in the beginning, but 
only after its threshold has been reached, the effect reverses and environmental performance 
ultimately serves profitability and market value. This is consistent with stakeholder theory. Our 
study would be of interest to firms, investors, and policy makers in the emerging East Asian 
economies by clarifying the role of corporate environmental performance as a long-term investment 
in enhancing financial profits and market value. 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we review the literature and develop 
our hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses the research methodology. We present the results in Section 
4.4. The final Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the results. 
 
4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1. Literature review 
A huge amount of studies have extensively explored the linkage between environmental 
performance and financial performance with contradictory findings. In this section, we discuss 
possible relationships between environmental and financial performance rooted in different 
theoretical frameworks and then link these relationships with recent empirical research. Adapted 
from Fujii et al. (2013), we summarize the four hypothetical relationships in the literature to date in 
Figure 4.1. Each hypothetical relationship describes the movement of financial performance (the 
vertical axis) when environmental performance increases (the horizontal axis).  




























Model (i) is a traditionalist view which suggests a trade-off relationship between environmental and 
financial performance. This view comes from Friedman’s (1970) classic statement that ‘the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits’. Accordingly, managers are solely responsible 
for maximizing shareholder return instead of any environmental and social purposes. It is argued 
that pollution abatement requires non-productive investments and imposes additional costs rather 
than economic benefits, thus weakens financial performance (Fujii et al., 2013). Costly and 
burdensome environmental activities are likely to put environmentally responsible firms at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to environmentally irresponsible competitors (Lankoski, 2008).  
An additional critique of the negative relation between environmental and financial performance 
emanates from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise when managers 
take advantage of imperfect control from shareholders to opportunistically overuse firm resources 
to pursue their desired missions and enhance their personal reputation (Navarro, 1988). 
Accordingly, environmental initiatives would maximise managerial private benefits at the expense 
of shareholder wealth rather than enhance significant returns to shareholders (Brammer and 
Millington, 2008). As a consequence, environmental performance causes agency costs, places a firm 
in an unfavourable position, decreases corporate efficiencies, and thus makes a negative impact on 
financial performance. 
The above theoretical considerations for the negative relationship are supported by empirical 
evidence. Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) find that both pollution prevention and end-of-pipe 
efficiencies negatively impact on short-term financial performance measured by return on sales for 
US firms. Similarly, Wagner et al. (2002) prove an uniformly negative relationship between 
environmental performance and return on capital employed (ROCE) in the case of European paper 
manufacturing industry that fits better with the traditionalist view. Likewise, Wang et al. (2014) 
support the win-lose hypothesis by confirming that Australian public firms spending expenditures 









Model (ii) provides a revisionist view that is strongly supported by Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
who propose the win-win hypothesis about the relationship between environmental and financial 
performance. Accordingly, environmental regulations stimulate firms to invest in innovative 
schemes for new environmental technologies, new environmentally friendly materials, and new 
environmentally friendly products and services (Trumpp and Guenther, 2017). A source of 
innovation generates first-mover advantages, market competitiveness, resource use efficiency, 
abatement cost reduction, and reputation acquisition for environmentally responsible firms (Xie et 
al., 2018). This is accordance with the resource based view of firms. As a consequence, strategic 
investments in environmental performance create extra economic benefits more than additional 
costs, thus translate into higher profits and higher market value (Nollet et al., 2016). The 
incorporation of environmental initiatives into corporate decisions would come up with win-win 
solutions (Beckmann et al., 2014). 
Since all firms are deeply embedded in a complex social system that shapes their behaviour, 
management should seriously consider not only shareholders’ wealth maximisation but also the 
needs of a wide variety of stakeholders. This view is consistent with Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder 
theory. Stakeholders tend to place their trust in firms that closely align with their expectations, for 
instance, consumers are willing to pay a premium for more sustainable products, desirable 
employees prefer to work at environmentally and socially conscious firms, financial investors are 
more attracted by sustainable firms, or policy makers reduce their regulatory pressures on 
responsible firms (Misani and Pogutz, 2015). Therefore, the integration of stakeholder expectations 
into a firm’s environmental strategies is expected to boost customers’ demand on green products, 
increase work efficiency of employees, minimize future financial liabilities, and mitigate the threat 
of environmental regulations, thus improve financial performance.  
Reviewing forty years of research, there has been a number of empirical studies supporting the 
positive relationship between environmental and financial performance. Hart and Ahuja (1996) 
prove that efforts to reduce emissions and to prevent pollution in S&P 500 firms boost operating 
performance in the following year. The significant positive correlation is also found between 






proactive environmental strategies and real economic benefits (Clarkson et al., 2013). More 
recently, Hussain et al. (2018) demonstrate that environmental performance as defined by Global 
Reporting Initiative framework can enhance both accounting profitability and market value.  
Inverted U-shaped relationship 
Model (iii) suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship with an argument that environmental 
performance is beneficial to some extent. Particularly, firms earn positive returns when 
environmental performance is below its optimum level. After reaching this maximum, the initial 
upward slope switches direction to establish the negative relation, at which additional investments 
in environmental performance exceed financial returns generated (Pierce and Aguinis, 2013). The 
inverted U-shaped correlation is assumed by the win-win hypothesis when environmental 
performance is lower than the optimum level and by the trade-off hypothesis when environmental 
performance increases beyond the optimum level. 
According to stakeholder theory, firms are required to satisfy the needs and build the trust of their 
various stakeholders. The integration of environmental issues into corporate strategy helps firms 
fulfil their stakeholders’ expectations and increase their reputation. Thus good environmental 
performance boosts financial performance. However, when the level of environmental performance 
strays beyond a certain threshold at which stakeholder management has little or no impact on 
stakeholder relations, additional investments in environmental protection would exceed financial 
returns generated (Brammer and Millington, 2008). This view is based on the law of diminishing 
marginal returns that implies the ‘too much of a good thing’ effect. For instance, the introduction of 
new cost-ineffective equipment or new environmentally friendly products is unlikely to improve 
market competitiveness when firms have already satisfied the environmental standards and their 
stakeholders’ requirements by adopting various cost-effective approaches to improve environmental 
performance (Fujii et al., 2013). Since the positive effects of environmental labelling and ‘green’ 
consumerism are limited (Pedersen and Neergaard, 2005), any excess environmental performance 
can possibly decrease financial performance.     
Some empirical studies support an inverted U-shape as the best description of the relationship 






sustainability practices and environmental management and find out an inverted U-shape of its 
impact on financial performance for the group of better financial performing firms in Germany and 
the UK. In a Japanese manufacturing setting, Fujii et al. (2013) prove an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between environmental performance and return on assets, implying that toxic chemical 
management boosts profitability until its optimum level. More recently, Misani and Pogutz (2015) 
use the sample of carbon-intensive firms in the Carbon Disclosure Project and support an inverted 
U-shaped effect of carbon performance on Tobin’s Q. 
U-shaped relationship 
Model (iv) describes a U-shaped relationship between environmental and financial performance 
under the ‘too little of a good thing’ effect. In particular, firms earn negative returns when the level 
of environmental performance is below a certain threshold. After exceeding the threshold, the 
downward sloping line eventually changes to the opposite direction. The conceptualization of the 
U-shaped pattern encompasses the trade-off hypothesis for the negative relation and the win-win 
hypothesis for the positive relation. The change from the negative to the positive direction could be 
explained by accrued stakeholder influence capacity (Barnett and Salomon, 2012) and/or corporate 
strategy choices (Brammer and Millington, 2008).  
Based on stakeholder theory, Barnett (2007: 803) develops the construct of stakeholder influence 
capacity that is “the ability of a firm to identify, act on, and profit from opportunities to improve 
stakeholder relationships through corporate social responsibility”. Accordingly, firms are 
encouraged in environmental investments to accrue stakeholder influence capacity (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2012). It is costly, however, with additional financial outlays to comply with 
environmental regulations, to make emission reduction, and to invest in human resources and 
capacity development for environmental protection. Thus firms earn negative returns on their 
investments. When stakeholder influence capacity accruing from significant environmental 
performance becomes adequate, firms are able to exploit stakeholder favour to transform their 
investments into positive returns.  
The choice between low cost and differentiation strategies can also explain the U-shaped pattern 






firms following low cost strategies try to avoid these costs to continuously appeal to their price-
sensitive consumers (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). For instance, adopting the end-of-pipe 
technology for pollution abatement regulations would increase costs that are partly passed on to 
their price-sensitive consumers by higher selling prices, thus decrease sales revenue and then 
decrease financial performance (Fujii et al., 2013). Alternatively, firms can take advantage of 
environmental practices to differentiate from their competitors in the eyes of environmentally 
conscious consumers and other stakeholders. As proposed by Hart (1995), the differences in 
environmental capacities and the possession of unique resources allow firms to pursue profitable 
environmental strategies and increase excess returns in the long term. 
Prior literature shows empirical evidence of a U-shaped relation between environmental and 
financial performance. Trumpp and Guenther (2017) provide a comprehensive empirical 
investigation on an international dataset of 2,361 firm-years in both manufacturing and service 
industries from 2008 to 2012. They prove that the impacts of carbon performance and waste 
intensity on return on assets are U-shaped in both industries. They also find out the U-shaped 
relationship between carbon performance and stock market performance in manufacturing 
industries. Similarly, Yu et al. (2018) support the non-linear relationship between Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure and Tobin’s Q in 47 developed and emerging countries with the evidence that greater 
ESG disclosure boosts firm value as soon as the disclosure score rises above the local minimum 
point.  
In summary, the literature provides contradictory findings on the relationship between 
environmental and financial performance. While studies on the impact of multiple types of 
environmental pollution data on financial performance are enormous, there has been no empirical 
study examine the non-linear relationship between a multidimensional construct of environmental 
performance and financial performance. Moreover, previous research mostly focuses on developed 
economies such as the US, Europe, and Japan or take a very board multi-national view. However, 
no study has particularly applied a non-linear functional form to consider this relationship in the 
context of emerging East Asia. Therefore, we attempt to clarify the relationship between 
environmental performance and financial performance in the emerging East Asian economies in the 






4.2.2. Hypothesis development 
As stated by Porter and Kramer (2011), business has been increasingly noticed as a major cause of 
environmental problems in the post financial crisis. Thus firms have been required to improve 
environmental performance with much efforts and treatments to conserve environmental resources 
and reduce environmental burdens (Fujii et al., 2013). In emerging East Asia, an improvement of 
resource use efficiency and an innovation production process of productivity growth have been 
encouraged by a number of firms in recent years to enhance their environmental performance and 
also reduce their operating costs (Dent, 2016). 
Environmentally responsible firms whose environmental protection goes far beyond the compliance 
level of regulatory standards would easily enhance stakeholder satisfaction (Trumpp and Guenther, 
2017). Especially in the East Asian context with the power of word-of-mouth communication, firms 
tend to acquire good reputations and enhance competitive advantages more easily when their 
environmental activities become visible to stakeholders. They could strengthen their multiple 
stakeholder relationships to have a greater impact on stakeholder decision making and, therefore, 
improve firm performance.  
Additionally, the emerging East Asian economies have been export oriented in recent years. The 
majority of their overseas customers come from developed countries where the demand for 
environmentally friendly products is increasing and the requirements of environmental protection 
are very strict (Dent, 2016). Under the stringent regulations on the entire product life cycle, 
environmental investments become essential to boost the market competitiveness of green products 
in the global markets. 
Taken together, strategic investments in environmental performance could eventually translate into 
higher profits and higher market value in East Asian firms. Therefore, we hypothesize that there is 
a positive relationship between environmental performance and financial performance as indicated 
by Model (ii) in Figure 4.1. 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between environmental performance and financial performance is 






H1a: The relationship between environmental performance and return on assets is linear and 
positive. 
H1b: The relationship between environmental performance and Tobin’s Q is linear and positive. 
A question arises, in East Asia, whether investments in environmental performance immediately 
boost financial performance or their positive effect can only be demonstrated in the long term. At 
the beginning of the environmental protection process, firms are required to engage in pollution 
abatement activities under the environmental laws and regulations. Costs of pollution abatement 
related to taxes, fees, and pollution charges, tradable permit systems, pollution abatement 
equipment, and environmentally-related administrative activities are generally perceived as 
additional expenditure on firms’ non-productive activities. For instance, wastewater treatment needs 
substantial investments in special equipment (e.g., absorbent materials or filters to remove water 
pollutants) but does not directly contribute to productivity improvement. Therefore, pollution 
abatement activities, either on a voluntary or obligatory basis, incur high costs. 
Additionally, consumer and market preferences are significantly influenced by product prices and 
product performance rather than environmentally friendly corporate images (Hibiki and Managi, 
2010). It is noted that price-sensitive consumers, who account for a majority in East Asia, are unable 
or unwilling to pay a premium for products and services provided by environmentally responsible 
firms (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004) or are rarely aware of information on firms’ pollution abatement 
when making consumer decisions (Hibiki and Managi, 2010). Consequently, environmentally 
irresponsible firms are likely to earn higher profits under price competition than environmentally 
responsible ones.  
Due to the increasing pollution problems in East Asia in the post financial crisis, the enforcement 
of environmental laws and regulations would satisfy stakeholders’ environmental expectations to 
some extent. Furthermore, strategic investments in environmental innovation, on the one hand, 
would require substantial initial costs on competencies and technologies, on the other hand, would 
bring firms a bundle of unique resources and capabilities to employ profitable environmental 
strategies and to enhance corporate reputation in the eyes of their stakeholders. Good environmental 






thus gradually influence consumer decision making, decrease their consumers’ price sensitivity, and 
increase the demand for their friendly environmental products with a price premium. In the long 
run, when stakeholder influence capacity is adequate, their environmental investments would be 
transformed into excess returns and positive market value. 
Taken together, we develop our hypothesis with the U-shaped relationship between environmental 
performance and financial performance as indicated by Model (iv) in Figure 4.1. 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between environmental performance and financial performance is 
U-shaped. 
H2a: The relationship between environmental performance and return on assets is U-shaped. 
H2b: The relationship between environmental performance and Tobin’s Q is U-shaped. 
 
4.3. Research method 
4.3.1. Data and sample selection 
We start with information on corporate environmental performance in the Asset4 ESG data of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. To date, Asset4 ESG has been extensively used in scholarly research 
(e.g., Daszynska-Zygadlo et al., 2016; Eding and Scholtens, 2017; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; 
Misani and Pogutz, 2015). This is an international and diversified dataset that covers over 4,000 
firms in the world and reports a wide range of data related to firms’ actual ESG performance. In 
particular, the ESG data consists of over 700 individual data points that are aggregated into 280 key 
performance indicators and are grouped within the following four dimensions: economic, 
environmental, social, and corporate governance performance. Each performance score of a certain 
firm is calculated by equally weighting and z-scoring all related underlying data points and 
comparing it to the DataStream universe. The score varies from zero to a hundred percent and a 






According to the classification of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI, 2016), the emerging 
East Asian countries include China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Our study focus on the period of 
2012-2016 when the emerging countries in East Asia have emphasized the importance of sustainable 
development in the new era. We obtain an initial sample of 350 firms (100 from China, 116 from 
South Korea, and 134 from Taiwan) that are available in DataStream from 2012-2016. The sampling 
firms account for approximately 40 percent of the total market capitalization in mainland China, 
represent nearly 70 percent of the total market capitalization in South Korea, and retain over 80 
percent of Taiwan’s market capitalization in 2016. We exclude 65 financial firms from the sample 
because of their distinctive characteristics compared to non-financial firms, and thus obtain 1,425 
firm-year observations from 2012 to 2016. We further eliminate 114 firm-year observations due to 
insufficient ESG data. A final unbalanced panel data ends up with of 1,311 firm-year observations 
in the three emerging East Asian markets from 2012-2016. 
 
4.3.2. Variable measurement 
Dependent variables: Corporate financial performance 
Return on assets (ROA) has been considered as a generally accepted measurement of accounting-
based performance that reflects backward-looking financial performance (Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
ROA indicates a firm’s accounting profitability relative to its asset utilization. Following previous 
studies (e.g., Wagner et al., 2002; Xie et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2018), we define ROA as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total assets. It is an essential way to eliminate the influences of 
financing decisions and tax environments on a firm’s accounting performance.  
While accounting data is generally based on historical information, a market-based measure takes 
into account financial risks and market expectations. Tobin's Q is mostly used in measuring a firm’s 
market valuation that reflects how much future cash flows the market expects a firm to provide per 
dollar of investment in assets (King and Lenox, 2001). It helps shareholders express their 
expectations of a firm’s long-term profitability and look at whether their investments should be 
made in the future (Wang et al., 2014). In our study, we use a simplified measure of Tobin’s Q 






(e.g., Dowell et al., 2000) approves little qualitative difference between the two measurements 
within this domain. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of total assets (the book 
value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of equity plus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit) to the book value of total assets. This measurement has 
been popularly used in many recent ‘pay to be green’ studies (e.g, Dowell et al., 2000; Flammer, 
2015; King and Lenox, 2001). 
Independent variable: Corporate environmental performance 
According to Asset4 ESG framework, the environmental performance score “measures a company’s 
impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as 
complete ecosystems” and “reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid 
environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to generate long term 
shareholder value” (Thomson Reuters, 2012). All indicators that have been used to determine the 
environmental performance score in DataStream have adequately covered both environmental 
management performance and environmental operational performance of a certain firm. Therefore, 
we use the environmental performance score in DataStream, that is a composite index of aggregate 
key performance indicators into one single score, as the measurement of an independent variable. 
Increasing score corresponds to better environmental performance, where zero percent reflects the 
least environmentally responsible firm and a hundred percent reflects the most environmentally 
responsible firm.  
Control variables 
Since the dependent variable captures accounting- and market-based performance, we control for 
factors that could systematically influence financial performance. We include a set of control 
variables that are previously identified as likely to affect financial performance in the extant 
literature, including firm size, firm leverage, firm growth, capital intensity, cash flow return on sales, 
and research and development (R&D) intensity (e.g., Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Fujii et al., 2013; 







Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars. Bigger firms are more 
profitable since they could better coordinate their resources or use more specialized inputs (Halkos 
and Tzeremes, 2005). However, a structure of small firms is flexible and non-hierarchical, thus 
could eliminate the so-call agency problem to improve firm performance (Fujii et al., 2013). 
Firm leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity. Firms with a higher level of debt 
would suffer more from financial risk, leading to a negative effect of leverage on financial 
performance (Trumpp et al., 2017). Meanwhile, debt could impose useful discipline on managers 
and incentivize them to maximize profits (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). 
Firm growth is measured as the change in total sales divided by total sales of the previous year. An 
increase in sales revenue acquired from the introduction of new products, the enlargement of current 
markets, and the exploitation of new markets can generate additional profits. Hence, we assume a 
positive effect of firm growth on financial performance (Trumpp et al., 2017). 
Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. It is argued that firms 
with higher capital intensity would have newer equipment to increase their productivity levels 
(Clarkson et al., 2011). Therefore, capital intensity is expected to positively impact on financial 
performance.  
Cash flow return on sales is measured as net operating cash flow divided by total sales. This 
indicator measures the capability of a firm to turn its sales revenue into net cash flow (Chen et al., 
2015). Prior research (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017) suggests that firms 
with higher levels of operating cash flow would have better financial performance.  
R&D intensity is calculated by the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales. R&D investments are 
crucial inputs to generate innovations from knowledge enhancement (Hall, 1999) which could have 
a short-term negative impact on profits but enhance financial performance in the long term (Trumpp 
and Guenther, 2017).  







Table 4.1 Measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
ROA  Return on assets 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets 
Independent variable 
ENV Environmental performance score 
Control variables 
SIZE Firm size 
LEV Firm leverage 
GROW Firm growth 
INT Capital intensity 
CASH Cash flow return on sales 
R&D R&D intensity 
 
4.3.3. Empirical model 
We begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification to determine an appropriate 
multivariate statistical method. We specify CFP (represents ROA and Tobin’s Q) as a function of 
the independent variable ENV and the control variables (abbreviated as X) for the ith firm in year t, 
in addition to an error term uit as shown in Equation 1. 
Equation 1: CFPit = β1 * ENVit + β2 * Xit + uit 
There is a possibility of a causal linkage between environmental and financial performance 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wagner and Blom, 2011). Financial performance could be 
simultaneously both a consequence and a cause of corporate environmental activities. Moreover, an 
improvement in environmental performance would generate or reduce profits only after a certain 
period of time (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Therefore, we use a one-year time lag of the independent 
variable to control for possible simultaneity and avoid an endogeneity problem. We also incorporate 






Equation 2: CFPit = β1 * ENVi(t-1) + β2 * Xi(t-1)  + uit 
Since in the panel data every firm is usually observed in different years, the possibility exists that 
the error term uit in Equation 2 is not independent across time (Greene, 2000). Many time-dependent 
macroeconomic factors, including government policy or systemic shocks, would influence 
industries and sectors, thus have an effect on firm performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2006). 
Accordingly, time effects on CFP is a systematic component to be embedded in the error term uit 
and causes the potential for residual serial correlation of the error term across observations over 
time. Therefore, we include yearly dummy variables, which we label Zt, to control for time effects 
as shown in Equation 3. 
Equation 3: CFPit = β1 * ENVi(t-1) + β2 * Xi(t-1)  + β3 * Zt  + eit 
The possibility still arises that the error term eit in Equation 3 is not independent within firms. A 
certain firm performs systematically differently from others over time due to its long-term and 
nontransient characteristics. Accordingly, all individual-specific variant and time invariant 
unobserved effects on CFP would be considered as a component of the error term eit. This 
component causes unobserved individual heterogeneity in the panel estimation. Therefore, we 
incorporate individual-specific variant and time invariant unobserved effects into the specification 
by decomposing error term eit in Equation 3 into firm effects (αi) and idiosyncratic error (Ɛit) in 
Equation 4.  
Equation 4: CFPit = β1 * ENVi(t-1) + β2 * Xi(t-1)  + β3 * Zt   + αi + Ɛit 
The linear model is extended into a quadratic model to investigate the non-linear relationship 
between ENV and CFP. We incorporate a quadratic term of ENV into Equation 4 to build the 
quadratic function in which the ENV variable works as the predictor and the moderator in the ENV-
CFP relation (Pierce and Aguinis, 2013), as shown in Equation 5.  
Equation 5: CFPit = β1 * ENVi(t-1) + β2 * ENVi(t-1)








4.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 Sample distribution 
Panel A. Distribution of firm-year observations by year and country 
 
Country  Total 
Year China S. Korea Taiwan  Observations In percent 
2012 65 78 102  245 18.7 
2013 65 82 105  252 19.2 
2014 67 85 107  259 19.8 
2015 71 90 110  271 20.7 
2016 73 99 112  284 21.7 
Total 341 434 536  1,311 100.0 
Panel B. Distribution of firm-year observations by industry and country 
 
Country 
Total Industry China S. Korea Taiwan 
Oil and gas (ICB 0001) 25 10 10 45 
Basic materials (ICB 1000) 70 45 59 174 
Industrials (ICB 2000) 135 162 156 453 
Consumer goods (ICB 3000) 43 103 67 213 
Health care (ICB 4000) 17 12 6 35 
Consumer services (ICB 5000) 15 44 30 89 
Telecommunications (ICB 6000) 5 15 18 38 
Utilities (ICB 7000) 20 10 0 30 
Technology (ICB 9000) 11 33 190 234 
Total 341 434 536 1,311 
ICB Industrial Classification Benchmark 
Table 4.2 presents the sample distribution by year and country (Panel A) and by industry and country 






are in China, 33 percent are in South Korea, and 41 percent are in Taiwan. The number of firms in 
the sample has increased from 2012 to 2016 as a positive sign for an effort to enhance environmental 
performance in emerging East Asia. Moreover, manufacturing industries account for a majority of 
the sample compared to service industries, which is explained by the relocation of manufacturing 
bases and production facilities to Asia after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables for 
the sample. All dependent and control variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentile to 
control for the outlier effect. Since the environmental performance score is z-scored in the ESG 
ratings and ranges from zero to a hundred percent, we decide to keep the original value of the 
independent variable.  
The mean of ROA and Tobin’s Q are positive and equal 0.049 and 1.408, respectively. These figures 
imply that firms in the sample are likely to be profitable with many growth opportunities. However, 
the two measures of firm performance provide somewhat different behaviour. ROA is a fairly stable 
financial performance indicator with its low standard deviation of 0.056. Meanwhile, Tobin’s Q is 
quite volatile, given its standard deviation of 0.941 and its range from 0.615 to 6.703. 
For the independent variable, the mean score of environmental performance is 51.8 percent 
indicating that East Asian firms tend to promote their environmental practices. Besides, the 
environmental performance score exhibits a relatively high variance among the sample, as shown 
by its standard deviation, suggesting different environmental initiatives in the listed firms in the post 
financial crisis. In panel B, there is an upward trend in the environmental performance score with 
an increase of its mean value from 46.4 percent in 2012 to 58.8 percent in 2016. This trend indicates 
that East Asian firms’ commitment to environmental sustainability is resilient over time. 
The mean of firm size equals 15.59 (equivalent to total assets of 5.46 billion US dollars), ranging 
from 12.30 (198 thousand US dollars) to 18.95 (56.20 billion US dollars). The ratio of debt to equity 
is 0.88 on average with its standard deviation of 1.06. The mean value of sales growth is positive at 
6.10 percent. In terms of capital intensity, East Asian firms averagely invest 5.90 percent of their 






is approximate 11.50 percent with its standard deviation of 12.60 percent. R&D intensity equals 
2.20 percent on average and ranges from 0 to 23.50 percent. 
Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of all variables  
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables 
ROA 1,311 0.049 0.056 -0.139 0.245 
Tobin’s Q 1,311 1.408 0.941 0.615 6.703 
Independent variable 
ENV 1,311 0.518 0.320 0.093 0.950 
Control variables 
SIZE 1,311 15.591 1.323 12.301 18.957 
LEV 1,311 0.877 1.058 0.000 6.789 
GROW 1,311 0.061 0.212 -0.488 1.000 
INT 1,311 0.059 0.051 0.001 0.246 
CASH 1,311 0.115 0.126 -0.166 0.603 
R&D 1,311 0.022 0.038 0.000 0.235 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of the environmental performance score 
Year Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
2012 245 0.464 0.320 0.102 0.941 
2013 252 0.504 0.328 0.093 0.940 
2014 259 0.502 0.323 0.098 0.939 
2015 271 0.521 0.318 0.099 0.944 
2016 284 0.588 0.301 0.114 0.950 
 
Table 4.4 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix between variables. As shown, the market-based 
performance Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with the accounting-based performance ROA (ρ = 
0.485). In other words, East Asian firms with greater levels of ROA generally have higher Tobin’s 
Q. In regard to the independent variable (ENV), its correlation with both the dependent variables is 






that higher environmental performance might lower financial performance. We need the 
multivariate regression analyses to better understand the nature of this relationship. 
We examine whether there are multicollinearity problems between the independent variable and 
control variables by using matrix correlation and running the variance inflation factor (VIF). The 
unconditional correlations are generally moderate in magnitude. In addition, no independent 
variable and control variables have VIF greater than 10, which is the generally accepted range for 
individual variables (Kennedy, 1998). We therefore conclude that there is no potential threat of 




Table 4.4 Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables 
 VIF ROA Tobin’s Q ENV SIZE LEV GROW INT CASH R&D 
ROA  1          
Tobin’s Q  0.485*** 1         
ENV 1.21 -0.107*** -0.152*** 1        
SIZE 1.35 -0.191*** -0.438*** 0.335*** 1       
LEV 1.16 -0.296*** -0.193*** 0.112*** 0.320*** 1      
GROW 1.07 0.238*** 0.138*** -0.148*** 0.050* -0.054* 1     
INT 1.16 0.187*** 0.170*** 0.075*** 0.059** -0.041 0.154*** 1   
CASH 1.18 0.403*** 0.162*** -0.037 -0.084*** -0.208*** 0.058** 0.329*** 1   
R&D 1.10 0.076*** 0.147*** 0.068** -0.241*** -0.135*** -0.007 0.012 0.098*** 1 




4.4.2. Regression results 
In order to confirm the chosen methodology for the panel regression estimations, we conduct some 
robustness check to analyse statistical assumptions of the regression. We use F-test and reject the 
null hypothesis that all firm specific intercept αi equal zero. Hence, fixed effects model is more 
suitable than pooled OLS to alleviate individual heterogeneity. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test is also conducted to confirm that random effects model is better than pooled OLS to 
deal with heterogeneity. Then, we apply Hausman test and find out that fixed effects model is more 
relevant and significant than random effects model. We conclude that fixed effects model is the 
most appropriate for our panel regression. Fixed effects estimations also prevent some endogeneity 
problems that rely on the correlation between the time-invariant component of the error (αi) and the 
independent variable. In addition, Rogers’ (1993) cluster-robust standard errors at firm level is 
employed in the regression to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the panel data 
(Drukker, 2003). All the results are presented in Table 4.5 for the ENV-ROA relation and Table 4.6 
for the ENV-Tobin’s Q relation. 
The relationship between environmental performance and accounting-based financial 
performance 
We posit financial performance to be linear function of environmental performance in Model 1 of 
Table 4.5. Particularly, we test whether higher score on environmental performance would increase 
or decrease firm performance. In Table 4.5, the result suggests that in the linear specification the 
effect of ENV on ROA is positive (β=0.001) but insignificant (p=0.93). There is no linear 
relationship between environment performance and accounting profitability, thus we are unable to 
confirm Hypothesis 1a.  
We turn to the relation between ENV and ROA in the quadratic model. The coefficient for the linear 
term of ENV in Model 2 is negative (β=-0.049) and the coefficient for the quadratic term of ENV 
is positive (β=0.052) at the 5% significance level. This is evidence of a U-shaped relationship 
between environmental performance and accounting-based financial performance. The finding 
implies that an increase in environmental performance causes a decrease in accounting profitability 






provides evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2a. Accordingly, firms with lower or higher 
environmental performance score would earn higher financial returns than other firms. Our finding 
is consistent with that of Trumpp and Guenther (2017) who find U-shaped impacts of carbon 
performance and waste intensity on ROA and is contradictory to that of Fujii et al. (2013) who find 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between the toxic management and ROA. 
Table 4.5 The relationship between environmental performance and accounting-based financial 
performance 
 Model 1 - ROA  Model 2 - ROA 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
ENV 0.001 0.09  -0.049** -2.02 
ENV2    0.052** 2.18 
SIZE -0.039*** -3.69  -0.038*** -3.66 
LEV 0.008 1.51  0.008 1.53 
GROW 0.029*** 3.68  0.029*** 3.69 
INT 0.004 0.09  0.005 0.13 
CASH 0.044* 1.67  0.045* 1.7 
R&D -0.231 -1.28  -0.233 -1.29 
Constant 0.640*** 3.98  0.640*** 4.00 
n 1,311  1,311 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value 3.22***  3.50*** 
Adj. R2 (within) 9.96  10.23 
Chi2 value (Hausman test) 83.87***  86.51*** 
Model Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors. 
In terms of the control variables, firm size is negatively associated with ROA at the 1% significance 






is positive and significant, indicating that the introduction of new products, the enlargement of 
current markets, or the exploitation of new markets would bring more accounting profitability. The 
correlation between CASH and ROA is positive and significant, implying that higher net operating 
cash flow from sales would decrease the provision for doubtful debts then increase accounting 
profitability. The other control variables, including LEV, INT, and R&D, have no significant impact 
on ROA. 
Figure 4.2 graphically depicts the U-shaped relationship between environmental performance and 
accounting-based financial performance. ROA declines at first as a firm’s environmental 
performance score increases, reaching a minimum at an environmental performance score of 47.1 
percent, but then continuously increases until it reaches a maximum environmental performance 
score of 100 percent. It is noted that ROA for the most environmentally responsible firms is greater 
in magnitude than for the least environmentally responsible firms. This results suggest that firms 
with maximally environmental responsibility are more profitable than firms with minimally 
environmental responsibility. 









The relationship between environmental performance and market-based financial 
performance 
Table 4.6 reports the regression results of the correlation between environmental performance and 
market-based financial performance. Considering the linear specification, the estimated coefficient 
for ENV in Model 1 is negative but insignificant. We conclude that there is no linear relationship 
between environment performance and market performance. Hypothesis 1b is rejected.  
Table 4.6 The relationship between environmental performance and market-based financial 
performance 
 Model 1 – Tobin’s Q  Model 2 – Tobin’s Q 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
ENV -0.101 -0.84  -0.765*** -2.69 
ENV2    0.700** 2.29 
SIZE 0.189 1.08  0.195 1.11 
LEV 0.008 0.32  0.010 0.37 
GROW 0.150* 1.72  0.150* 1.72 
INT 0.729 1.27  0.749 1.31 
CASH -0.042 -0.11  -0.034 -0.09 
R&D -1.714 -1.21  -1.738 -1.23 
Constant -1.441 -0.54  -1.447 -0.54 
n 1,311  1,311 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes 
F value 10.52***  9.86*** 
Adj. R2 (within) 8.16  8.60 
Chi2 value (Hausman test) 85.10***  97.79*** 
Model Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 






We turn to the non-linear relationship between ENV and Tobin’s Q by adding a squared term of 
ENV in Model 2. Consistent with our expectation, we find a negative and significant coefficient for 
ENV (β=-0.765 at p=0.00) and a positive and significant coefficient for its quadratic (β=0.700 at 
p=0.02). This is strong evidence of a U-shaped relationship between environmental performance 
and market-based financial performance. Accordingly, the impact of environmental performance on 
market financial performance is negative at first and then, beyond a certain level of ENV, the 
relation switches to positive. From that time, an improvement of environmental performance leads 
to superior firm value. Hypothesis 2b is accepted. Our finding is supported by Yu et al. (2018) who 
find a U-shaped relationship between ESG disclosure and Tobin’s Q. 
In terms of the control variables, the correlation between GROW and Tobin’s Q is positive and 
significant, implying that positive sales growth is likely to be attractive to shareholders in East Asia, 
leading to an increase in share prices and thus an increase in market financial performance. We 
could not find any significant relationship between the other control variables and market-based 
financial performance. 
Figure 4.3 The U-shaped relationship between environmental performance and market-based 
financial performance 
 
Figure 4.3 graphically depicts the U-shaped relationship between environmental performance and 
market-based financial performance. As a firm’s environmental performance score increases, 






equals 54.6 percent. After that, the improvement of environmental performance boosts Tobin’s Q. 
We note that even at the maximum environmental performance score of 100 percent, however, 
Tobin’s Q does not recover to reach the levels achieved by the minimum environmental performance 
score. The findings imply that it is less financial beneficial to be maximally environmentally 
responsible than minimally environmental responsible.  
 
4.5. Discussions and conclusions 
The objective of our investigation is to clarify the relationship between environmental performance 
and financial performance in linear and quadratic functions. Both accounting-based and market-
based measures are utilized to capture two different aspects of financial performance. Accordingly, 
we extend prior research by investigating a non-linear effect of environmental performance on 
financial performance in the emerging East Asian markets in the post global financial crisis. 
Whereas existing literature has neglected the multidimensional construct of environmental 
performance, our study gives a more comprehensive insight into environmental performance by 
using the environmental performance score provided by Asset4 ESG data of Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. 
Our findings demonstrate that environmental performance has U-shaped relationships with both 
accounting-based and market-based financial performance. Accordingly, the improvement of 
environmental performance decreases financial performance until its certain threshold is reached, 
further investments in environmental performance would increase excess returns. We confirm the 
robustness of the findings since they are entirely consistent across two financial performance 
measures. Our findings are in line with a recent strand in the literature that suggests firms’ strategic 
investments in environmental protection as a long-term strategy to improve their overall financial 
performance.  
The empirical evidence confirms the integration of the trade-off hypothesis for firms with poor 
environmental performance and the win-win hypothesis for firms with good environmental 
performance into the theoretical framework of the ‘too little of a good thing’ effect with respect to 






green’ after exceeding the threshold of environmental performance. One opportunity to obtain a 
change from a negative to a positive impact of environmental performance on financial performance 
would be the adequacy of accrued stakeholder influence capacity as suggested by Barnett (2007). 
Accordingly, there is a variation in benefits across the range of environmental performance, such 
that stakeholder influence capacity gradually accrues to provide benefits that come to meet and then 
exceed the costs of being environmental responsible. We can conclude that our findings are 
supported by stakeholder theory that “the better a firm manages its relationships with the myriad 
groups that have some interest, or ‘stake,’ in the firm, the more successful it will be over time” 
(Barnett and Salomon, 2012: 1305). We have some practical implications for the emerging East 
Asian economies as follows.  
Firms can achieve higher financial profits and higher market value only when their environmental 
performance reaches a low or high level. When environmental performance falls into the 
intermediate range, firms would get ‘stuck in the middle’ (Porter, 1980: 41). In particular, profit-
maximizing firms tend to produce environmental responsibility at a level that meets market demand. 
They neither take advantage of cost savings from not engaging in voluntary pollution abatement 
activities nor benefit from improved stakeholder relations when they conduct intermediate 
environmental performance. We suggest that managers should be aware of their capacity to 
influence their stakeholders through environmental performance to make their corporate 
environmental strategy choice between low cost and differentiation.   
Our findings also imply that firms should view environmental performance as a long-term 
investment. Although pollution abatement weakens financial performance in the beginning, firms 
can enhance their long-run environmental performance beyond a certain level to ultimately achieve 
their excess returns and boost their market value. Therefore, firms are generally encouraged to be 
highly responsive to the environment and use corporate environmental responsibility as a part of 
their long-term strategic planning to continuously serve the interests of their stakeholders, and once 
adequate stakeholder influence capacity is built, firms would be rewarded with an increase in 
financial performance. Otherwise, relying on near-term financial returns to adopt certain 






Our findings can answer two important questions: ‘do it pay to green?’ and ‘when does it pay to 
green?’. Understanding whether and when environmental performance generates excess returns is 
relevant to firms, policy makers, and investors. Firms with intermediate environmental performance 
should be aware of a required minimum level of environmental performance to capitalize on their 
environmental responsibility efforts and thus to produce a positive effect on financial performance. 
Policy makers should understand firm differences in environmental initiatives to provide suitable 
incentives for average firms to be interested in environmental protection and gain market 
competiveness. We also emphasize the necessity for incorporating a firm’s level of environmental 
performance into the investment decision-making process of investors, leading to their optimal 
investment decisions in the long run. 
There are some limitations in our study. The sample is representative but is restricted to listed East 
Asian firms that have conducted sustainability performance at least in the minimum level. The 
environmental indicators are considered as voluntary compliance rather than mandatory 
requirements. Thus the measurement of environmental performance could be refined through 
distinguishing between voluntary and mandatory environmental regulations. The study pays no 
attention to moderating or mediating effects on the relationship between environmental and financial 
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The dissertation examines the determinants and the effects of corporate sustainability performance 
in the emerging East Asian economies in the post global financial crisis. It is argued that all policies 
on corporate sustainability performance have emanated from a board of directors, so that we focus 
on board attributes as the main determinants of corporate sustainability performance in the first 
study. Since financial reporting is an important part of a communication process between firms and 
all their stakeholders, we address the effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial 
reporting quality in the second study. We also clarify the role of corporate environmental 
performance, as a dimension of corporate sustainability performance, in enhancing financial 
performance in the third study. The summary of each individual study in the dissertation is presented 
as follows.  
The first study investigates the influence of board structure on the economic, environmental, and 
social dimensions of corporate sustainability performance through the lens of agency theory and 
stakeholder theory. If the corporate commitment to sustainable development is to satisfy 
environmental and social needs and to develop long-term relationships with all stakeholder groups 
for sustainable business, we expect that firms with a good board of directors would demonstrate 
their commitment by enhancing all different dimensions of sustainability performance. The sample 
includes non-financial listed firms in the emerging East Asian economies from 2011-2016 that are 
collected from Asset4 ESG data of Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
We find empirical evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between board size and the 
environmental dimension of sustainability performance. Though, we observe the linear and positive 
relationship between board size and the social sustainability dimension, indicating that expanding 
the number of board directors would linearly improve social performance. Besides, we provide 
strong evidence that the proportion of independent directors positively affects environmental and 
social sustainability performance. However, we reveal that the separation of CEO and board chair 
roles has no impact on all three sustainability dimensions. Our study would be of interest to firms, 
investors, and policy makers by identifying the role of a corporate board in the three dimensions of 
corporate sustainability performance and by providing a foundation for their efforts to enhance 






The second study examines whether sustainable firms provide transparent financial reporting for 
their stakeholders. To answer this research question, we explore the relationship between corporate 
sustainability performance and earnings management. If corporate sustainability performance is 
emanated from an ethical perspective, we predict that sustainable firms are less likely to engage in 
earnings management and provide their stakeholders with transparent and reliable financial 
information. The sample includes non-financial listed firms in the emerging East Asian economies 
in 2012-2016 that are collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
Our empirical results support the premise that firms with better sustainability performance are less 
likely to engage in earnings management, thus provide their stakeholders with transparent and 
reliable financial reporting. The findings are consistent with the ethical perspective which 
emphasizes the ethical obligations of management to all various stakeholders especially when they 
follow sustainable development strategies. This study contributes to the literature by emphasizing 
the role of corporate sustainability performance in constraining earnings management and the role 
of ethics in providing transparent and reliable financial reporting. 
The third study clarifies the relationship between corporate environmental performance and 
corporate financial performance in both linear and quadratic functions in the emerging East Asian 
markets. Both accounting-based and market-based measures are utilized to capture two different 
aspects of financial performance. We offer a comprehensive insight into corporate environmental 
performance by using the environmental performance score provided by Asset4 ESG data of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
We find strong evidence that environmental performance has a U-shaped relationship with 
accounting-based and market-based financial performance. Accordingly, an increase in 
environmental performance deteriorates financial performance until its certain threshold is reached, 
from then on the effect reverses and environmental performance ultimately serves profitability and 
market value. The empirical evidence confirms the integration of the trade-off hypothesis for firms 
with poor environmental performance and the win-win hypothesis for firms with good 
environmental performance into the theoretical framework of the ‘too little of a good thing’ effect. 
Our findings have some practical implications by emphasizing the role of environmental 






5.2. Practical implications 
The findings in the dissertation have practical implications for firms, stakeholders, and policy 
makers in the emerging East Asian economies.  
Firms are encouraged to follow sustainable development strategies and achieve the outstanding 
outcomes in economic development, environmental protection, and social responsibility. The 
implication emanates from the important role of corporate sustainability performance that is 
approved through its positive effects on financial reporting quality and overall financial 
performance. In order to pursue sustainable development strategies, firms should consider the 
human resources of their board of directors. A superior board structure can be a valuable tool to 
strengthen the corporate board and thus improve corporate sustainability performance. 
Shareholders should be aware of sustainable development strategies and corporate sustainability 
performance of a certain firm. They can motivate corporate sustainability performance in their firms 
by promoting the suitable size of a corporate board and the high proportion of independent directors. 
Current and potential investors are encouraged to incorporate the firm level of corporate 
sustainability performance into their investment decision-making process, leading to the optimal 
investment decisions in the long run. 
Other stakeholders should consider the structure of a board of directors as an important element to 
evaluate corporate sustainability performance of a certain firm. Moreover, information related to 
corporate sustainability performance would provide outsiders with possible implications for firms’ 
financial reporting quality and financial performance. Thus outsiders can differentiate 
environmentally and socially responsible firms with transparent financial information and good 
financial performance from environmentally and socially irresponsible firms. 
Regulators and policy makers could identify corporate board attributes as a further regulatory focus 
for listed firms to improve corporate governance practices and to implement sustainable 
development. In addition, the findings are useful for them to understand firms’ business practices 






makers also understand differences in environmental initiatives between firms to provide them with 
suitable incentives in environmental protection. 
 
5.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
There are some limitations in our dissertation. We try to recognize the limitations and expect further 
research on these issues. 
We collect data related to corporate sustainability performance from the Asset4 ESG database of 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. DataStream is an international and diversified dataset that covers 
approximate 4,000 global firms and reports a wide range of data related to firms’ actual ESG 
performance. However, it is likely that sustainable development has been a relatively new concept 
in the emerging markets and environmental and social performance is not or weak mandated by 
legislation in many East Asian countries during our study period. The sample is representative but 
is restricted to listed firms in emerging East Asia that have conducted sustainability performance at 
least in the minimum level. We expect that more East Asian firms would raise their growing concern 
about sustainable development in recent years, so we can enlarge our sample size. 
We base the dissertation on the triple bottom line approach. Sustainable development requires the 
balance and the integration of economic growth, environmental protection, and social responsibility. 
Thus the importance of the three dimensions of corporate sustainability performance is equally 
considered. In addition, the basic premise of triple bottom line performance is its voluntary nature 
so that we keep in view of the voluntary nature of sustainability initiatives. We expect future 
research to focus on the weights of the economic, environmental, and social sustainability 
performance in the calculation of corporate sustainability performance. The measurement of 
economic, environmental, and social performance should be also refined through distinguishing 
between voluntary and mandatory regulations. 
